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FRANCIS J. MOOTZ 111* 
INTRODUCTION 
The market for Employment Practices Liability Insurance 
("EPL") continues to grow at a phenomenal rate.1 The number of 
insurers offering EPL protection has increased from a handful only 
eight years ago to more than seventy today. Moreover, the cover­
ages being offered have dramatically expanded even as premiums 
have been cut substantially.2 The rapid expansion of EPL poses no 
great mystery. In the past thirty years there has been a tremendous 
increase in employment-related litigation and liabilities, as well as a 
corresponding unwillingness by insurance carriers to assume this 
risk in General Liability policies. As with all insurance products, 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I would like 
to thank my colleague, Sam Stonefield, for his many helpful conversations about the 
uncertain state of sexual harassment law and for his extensive assistance with Part I of 
this Article in the form of suggesting examples and language for the text. I would like 
to thank my partner, Caren Senter, for equally illuminating conversations and editorial 
assistance based on her years of practice experience in the area of sexual harassment 
law. 
1. See Growing Trend Toward EPL, PROFESSIONAL AGENT, Jan. 1999, at 7; see 
also Robert E. Calkins et aI., Employment Practices Liability Insurance-From Luxury 
to Necessity?, CHARTERED PRoP. & CAS. UNDERWRITER J., Fall 1998, at 170. 
2. For recent industry discussions of the growth and changing nature of the EPL 
market, see Jeffrey P. Klenk, Emerging Coverage Issues in Employment Practices Lia­
bility Insurance: The Industry Perspective on Recent Developments, 21 W. NEW. ENG. L. 
REv. 323 (1999); Dave Pelland, Exploring Employment Practices and Policies, 45 RISK 
MGMT. No.1, Jan. 1, 1998; Sally Roberts, Spotlight Report: A Closer Look at Specialty 
Risks: Environmental & Professional Liability: Maturing EPL Market Offering En­
hanced Cover, Bus. INS., June 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8294830; Richard S. Bet­
terley, Employment Practices Liability Insurance Market Survey: 1998: A Year of 
Growth, and New Coverages, THE BETTERLEY REpORT (Betterley Risk Consultants, 
Inc. 1998), available in <http://www.betterley.comlpublicationslpub_emerg.html>. 
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EPL has developed in response to consumer demand to fill a vac­
uum in the established insurance market. 
There is every reason to believe that this growth will continue 
into the foreseeable future as the EPL market becomes more estab­
lished. EPL marketers must have been pleased to read in a recent 
district court opinion that the chief financial officer who was suing 
for sexual harassment had warned her employer that it better sober 
up and check to make sure that it had sufficient EPL coverage.3 
EPL is likely to become a standard part of most business insurance 
programs as risk managers begin to demand this coverage as part of 
a comprehensive loss avoidance and insurance program.4 
Despite the phenomenal growth and current profitability of 
EPL, long-term success for this product is by no means guaranteed. 
EPL faces substantial challenges because employment law is a rela­
tively new field that is still unstable and lacks coherent guiding prin­
ciples. As employment law matures, EPL carriers might find that 
they have unwittingly signed onto risks that they can only vaguely 
imagine today. In the interest of focus and detail, I will assess the 
challenges facing EPL carriers by discussing only one kind of em­
ployment-related liability under federal law that confronts employ­
ers. As a form of sexual harassment, "hostile work environment" 
liability provides just one example of a risk that remains uncertain, 
not just because the cost of the exposure facing employers is diffi­
cult to calculate, but because the very nature of the cause of action 
remains unsettled. Insurance carriers traditionally respond to un­
certain risks by attempting to gather more and better loss data and 
underwrite more carefully. But when the very nature of the liability 
is not yet settled, this approach proves problematic. 
This Article is relatively complex despite having a narrow fo­
cus, but this complexity is· part of the theme of the Article. Assess­
ing the role that EPL might play in the future requires an 
understanding of two murky areas of law: employment law and in­
surance coverage law. In Part I of the Article I discuss the evolu­
tion of employer liability for hostile work environment sexual 
harassment. Because cases reaching the Supreme Court have irt­
3. See Lynch v. New Deal Delivery Servo Inc., 974 F. Supp. 441, 447 (D.N.J. 1997). 
4. See Michael Bradford, Lower Liability Outlay Cut Cost of Risk: Study, Bus. 
INS., Feb. 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8767961 (reporting that the 1998 RIMS Bench­
mark Survey indicated that EPL is becoming a common part of a risk manager's portfo­
lio); see also Keeping a Lid on Workplace Lawsuits, 46 RISK MGMT. No.2, Feb. 1, '1999 
(reporting that a recent survey of human resource professionals revealed that 48% had 
purchased EPL coverage). 
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volved wrongdoers who are supervisors, the Court has used agency 
principles to impose liability on the employer for the actions of its 
employees. Under this approach, the employer is considered to 
have acted through its agent to discriminate against..one or more 
employees. However, I argue that the nature of the claim for hos­
tile work environment sexual harassment is such that negligence 
principles in fact guide the determination of employ~r .liability, and 
that the uniform practice in the lower courts of usipg negligence 
principles to impose liability on employers for hostile work environ­
ment harassment committed by co-employees or thir:Q persons has 
effectively been adopted by the Supreme Court in the supervisory 
context as well. This reconceptualization is significant for insurance 
coverage purposes because the employer's liability is no longer pre­
mised on the claim that the employer has engaged in the intentional 
wrongdoing, but only that it negligently permitted the wrongdoing 
to occur. 
In Part II of the Article I analyze the consequences for insur­
ance coverage that follow from recognizing that liability for hostile 
work environment sexual harassment is grounded on negligence 
principles. First, I demonstrate that employers will have stronger 
arguments that coverage for this liability is available under their 
General Liability policy and under their Workers' Compensationi 
Employers' Liability policy if hostile work environment sexual har­
assment is founded on the employer's negligence. Although these 
policy forms now contain express exclusions for "employment-re­
lated practices" liabilities, coverage might be available to the extent 
that the facts in a given case fall outside the scope of the exclusion. 
Next, I argue that insurance carriers (including EPL carriers who 
may attempt to avoid cpverage obligations in the event that the risk 
of liability for hostile work environment sex discrimination dramati­
cally increases) will have no legitimate basis to avoid coverage for 
hostile work environment sexual harassment under the public pol­
icy defense, since liability is not imposed on account of intentional 
,or malicious behavior by the employer. 
In conclusion, I emphasize that the changing nature of hostile 
work environment sexual harassment law is just one example of the 
doctrinal uncertainty that confronts EPL carriers, and that this one 
example reveals the complexity of the situation that these carriers 
face. This is not to suggest that employment-related liabilities are 
too uncertain to insure. However, it is clear that the companies 
now racing to participate in this growing market must exercise, a 
great deal of caution and remain attentive to the ever-changing nu­
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ances of employment law if they are to succeed in this line of 
business. 
I. NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES PROVIDE THE BEST RATIONALE 

FOR IMPOSING LIABILITY ON EMPLOYERS FOR HOSTILE 

WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT. 

An employer may be liable under Title VIP if its employees 
are sexually harassed in the workplace. The first harassment cases 
under Title VII involved racial harassment of employees,6 but at 
least by 1977 courts were acknowledging that sexual harassment 
also provided a basis for employer liability under Title VIP In 
twenty years sexual harassment has grown from a fledgling inter­
pretation of Title VII to a substantial liability risk. that is well 
known by every employer. Beginning with the Senate hearings on 
Anita Hill's stunning allegations that, while Chairman of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Clarence 
Thomas created a hostile and abusive work environment with his 
sexual propositions and banter, sexual harassment has received ex­
tensive media attention during this decade. Not surprisingly, the 
number of claims of sexual harassment has increased tremendously 
in response to this publicity. Between 1990, following the Thomas­
Hill hearings, and 1995, the number of sexual harassment claims 
filed with the EEOC more than doubled.8 The number of filings 
has remained at this level in subsequent years.9 
Most discussions about sexual harassment concern the legal 
boundaries of actionable behavior. The lay public appears fasci­
nated by judicial determinations of when a crude joke, a clumsy 
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). 
6. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding, for the first 
time, that racial harassment was a violation of TItle VII); see also Meritor Say. Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986) (discussing the impact of the Rogers decision). 
7. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that there is 
no support for "the notion that employment conditions summoning sexual relations 
between employees and superiors are somehow exempted from the coverage of TItle 
VII"). Barnes is generally regarded as the first case to expressly treat sexual harass­
ment as a violation of TItle VII. 
8. See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1990 Annual 
Report 17 (1991) (6,879 filings). For data on sexual harassment filings for 1992-1998 see 
Enforcement Statistics, Sexual Harassment Charges 1992-98, THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOY· 
MENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMISSION, available in <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.htmi> 
(visited Sept. 29, 1999) (15,549 filings in 1995). 
9. See Enforcement Statistics, Sexual Harassment Charges 1992-98, THE U.S. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMISSION, available in <http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
stats/harass.htmi>. 
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proposition, or excessive physical contact might constitute a civil 
rights violation. However, defining conduct that constitutes sexual 
harassment is only one part of the legal analysis. Because employ­
ers are not strictly liable for all forms of sexual harassment in the 
workplace, courts must separately rule on the employer's culpabil­
ity after determining that an employee has been sexually harassed. 
In this part of the Article I argue that an employer's liability under 
Title VII for hostile work environment sexual harassment should be 
determined according to negligence principles, and that for all prac­
tical purposes, the courts have adopted this approach. 
A. Defining Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
Following Catherine MacKinnon's path-breaking book, Sexual 
Harassment of Working Women,lO courts and commentators have 
traditionally recognized two theories of liability for sexual harass­
ment--quid pro quo and hostile work environment. A quid pro quo 
case exists when the employer's agent demands sexual conduct as a 
term or condition of the employee receiving the full benefits of con­
tinued employment.ll If a supervisor demands that a female em­
ployee perform sexual acts in exchange for favorable treatment 
(such as a favorable performance review, a pay raise, or a promo­
tion), that sexual demand becomes part of the exchange (quid pro 
quo) between the employer and the employee.12 In quid pro quo 
cases, courts have concluded that the employer is automatically lia­
ble for the intentional wrongdoing of its authorized agents.13 In the 
second type of sexual harassment case, courts will hold an employer 
liable under certain circumstances when an employee is subjected 
to a "hostile work environment." First, the court must find that the 
10. CATIlERINE MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: 
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). 
11. The Guidelines on Sexual Harassment promulgated by' the EEOC describe 
quid pro quo harassment in the following terms: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) sub­
mission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condi­
tion of an individual's employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affect­
ing such individual . . . . 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999). 
12. See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510-13 (9th Cir. 1994). 
13. See MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LmGA. 
TION § 6.6 (1997) ("Every court of appeals to address the issue in the quid pro quo 
context has held the employer absolutely liable for the sexual harassment by a supervi­
sor resulting in tangible detriment to the subordinate employee."). 
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work environment is so severely or pervasively hostile that it consti­
tutes a discriminatory workplace. As discussed in the next section, 
the court must also determine whether (and under what circum­
stances) the hostile work environment should be attributed to the 
employer as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court first recognized the hostile work environ­
ment interpretation of Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson. 14 In what amounted to an easy test case, the Court held 
that actionable sexual harassment existed when a bank president 
made repeated demands for sex, raped the employee on several oc­
casions, and repeatedly abused her in front of other employees, 
even though the employee was not threatened with negative job 
consequences if she rebuffed this behavior nor did she receive any 
tangible job benefits for submitting to this behavior.15 Finding that 
the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions 
of the plaintiff's employment by creating an abusive or hostile work 
environment, the Court held that the employee had suffered dis­
crimination due to her gender despite the absence of a quid pro 
quo.16 The Meritor test was subsequently refined in Harris v. Fork­
lift Systems, Inc.,n when the Court ruled that an employer is liable 
for a hostile work environment even if the employee does not suffer 
severe psychological harm.18 The Harris opinion established a two­
pronged test for determining whether a workplace is hostile: abu­
sive conduct in the workplace must be severe or pervasive enough 
to create an objectively hostile environment as measured by"a 'rea­
sonable person standard, and the conduct must also be subjectively 
perceived as abusive by the complaining employee.19 
The Harris test has been applied to widely divergent fact sce­
narios by numerous courts, leading to a kind of "common law" de­
velopment of the definition of hostile work environment.20 These 
cases make clear that the simple model of quid pro quo, typically 
sexual activity exchanged for tangible job benefits, has not just been 
expanded. Instead, a hostile work environment claim represents an 
entirely distinct type of claim. Although demanding or engaging in 
unwelcome sexual activity is often an important element in creating 
14. 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986). 
15. See id. at 59-61. 
16. See id. at 72-73. 
17. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
18. See id. at 22-23. 
19. See id. at 21. 
20. See ROSSEIN, supra note 13, § 6.7. 
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a hostile work environment, the concept of gender discrimination is 
not limited to cases in which the wrongdoer is attempting to gratify 
his sexual desire. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,21 
the Supreme Court recently held that a male employee experienced 
a hostile work environment when he was subjected to physical as­
saults of a sexual nature by heterosexual male workers. As Justice 
Scalia explained, "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sex­
ual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of 
sex,"22 because, the "critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is 
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms 
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are 
not exposed."23 
Such a broad interpretation of hostile work environment sex­
ual harassment exposes employers to liability in a wide variety of 
circumstances. In a tightly reasoned and persuasive article, Profes­
sor Vicki Schultz argued that hostile work environment liability ul­
timately should be reconceptualized to encompass abusive behavior 
(not necessarily sexual in nature at all) that undermines the full par­
ticipation of women in the workforce by maintaining workplaces 
"as bastions of masculine competence and authority."24 This ap­
proach gained support in Oncale's emphasis that gender discrimina­
tion, rather than sexual activity, is the target of Title VIps The 
purpose of Title VII is not to create a code of sexual morality in the 
workplace, but instead to eradicate discrimination throughout the 
economy.26 Consequently, when a co-worker engages in a pattern 
21. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
22. Id. at 1002. 
23. Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring». 
24. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 
1687 (1998). Professor Schultz argued that: 
Singling out sexual advances as the essence of workplace harassment has al­
lowed courts to feel enlightened about protecting women from sexual viola­
tion, while at the same time relieving judges of the responsibility to redress 
other, broader gender-based problems in the workplace.... We need an ac­
count of hostile work environment harassment that highlights its dynamic rela­
tionship to larger forms of gender hierarchy at work. 
Id. at 1690. 
25. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (explaining that gender discrimination exists "if 
a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman 
as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of 
women in the workplace"). Professor Schultz briefly noted that her thesis was sup­
ported to some degree by Oncale, which was decided just as her article went to press. 
See Schultz, supra note 24, at 1692 n.18. 
26. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975), cited in 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). As the Court acknowledged 
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of physically abusive and derogatory behavior directed at women 
employees, a cause of action for hostile work environment will lie, 
despite the lack of any sexual overtones.27 The developing law of 
hostile work environment sex discrimination therefore represents a 
substantial exposure to liability for employers that is not covered by 
the "sexual favors" model of quid pro quo liability. 
B. 	 Employer Liability for Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment: The Move Toward a Negligence Standard 
The fact-driven standard developed in Meritor and Harris ad­
dresses only whether a hostile work environment exists, and not 
whether the employer should be held liable for the hostile work 
environment. Because only company officers and supervisors have 
the authority to grant or withhold tangible job benefits, in quid pro 
quo cases courts hold the employer automatically and vicariously 
liable for the actions of these agents when they engage in conduct 
that constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment. On the other 
hand, in hostile work environment cases the wrongdoer need not 
have any authority in order to create the hostile environment, since 
co-workers and even third persons such as vendors or customers 
might act in a manner that renders the workplace hostile. Conse­
quently, the theoretical basis for holding the employer liable for the 
existence of a hostile work environment is not as clear. In Meritor, 
the Court refused to adopt a definitive rule of employer liability in 
light of the undeveloped character of the record in that case; but 
the Court did embrace the EEOC practice of looking to agency 
when it recognized the hostile work environment basis of liability, "Title VII affords 
employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule and insult." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
27. 	 See Smith v. Sheahan, No. 98-2445, 1999 WL 667262, at *4-5 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 
1999). According to the court: 
It makes no difference that the assaults and the epithets sounded more like 
expressions of sex-based animus rather than misdirected sexual desire 
(although power plays may lie just below the surface of much of the latter 
behavior as well). Either is actionable under Title VII as long as there is evi­
dence suggesting that the objectionable workplace behavior is based on the 
sex of the target. 
... In a sex discrimination case, the action need not be inspired by sexual 
desire, assuming for the sake of argument that rape or sexual assault is any­
thing but an act of violence. Breaking the arm of a fellow employee because 
she is a woman, or, as here, damaging her wrist to the point that surgery was 
required, because she was a woman, easily qualifies as a severe enough iso­
lated occurrence to alter the conditions of her employment. 
Id. at *5 (citation omitted). 
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principles for guidance even while noting that "such common-law 
principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title 
VII."28 The Supreme Court then waited until 1998 to discuss fur­
ther the basis for employer liability, and in the intervening twelve 
years the lower courts struggled to formulate a proper standard of 
liability. 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court deferred to the EEOC's inter­
pretation of Title VII by adopting the principles of agency law as 
the standard for assessing employer liability. This approach is sen­
sible in quid pro quo cases. Because acts directly related to tangible 
job benefits are "official" actions, they uniformly are regarded as 
the acts of the employer for legal purposes. However, in the con­
text of hostile work environment sexual harassment, agency princi­
ples can be both too strong and too weak to effectively fulfill the 
purposes of Title VII. Consider the difficulty of using agency prin­
ciples to determine an employer's liability for continual sexual ban­
ter directed at women in the company cafeteria during the lunch 
hour. If a supervisor is responsible for discriminatory behavior and 
agency principles are strictly applied, the employer would be auto­
matically and strictly liable for this behavior even if it was person­
ally motivated, harmful to the company, and in direct contravention 
of express company policy. On the other hand, if a non-supervisory 
co-worker creates the hostile environment, then under agency prin­
ciples it would be difficult to hold the employer responsible for this 
behavior even though the effect on the employee being harassed 
may be to preclude her from working effectively. The same analysis 
would apply with even greater force in the case of a customer or 
vendor who regularly uses the employer's cafeteria and behaves in 
a manner that creates a hostile work environment. If agency law 
provided the sole standard for employer liability, the result would 
be to reduce Title VII from a statutory mandate that employers 
must keep their workplace free from discrimination to permit the 
full participation of women in the workforce into a more modest 
statutory ban on discrimination carried out by the employer 
through its agents. 
Given these complexities, the lower courts struggled after Mer­
itor to develop a coherent theory of employer liability that fulfilled 
the statutory mandate of Title VII. An obvious answer was 
adopted in numerous cases: negligence principles, rather than the 
principles of agency law, provide the standard of the employer's lia­
28. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 72. 
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bility for hostile work environment sex harassment.29 In cases 
where the abusive environment was created by co-workers or non­
employees, negligence quickly was adopted as the only plausible 
basis for imposing liability on employers.3o For example, in a case 
involving a waitress who was fondled and harassed by customers 
before fleeing the restaurant in tears, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the employer could be liable for hostile work 
environment sexual harassment only if it had negligently permitted 
the harassment to OCCUr.31 Notwithstanding Meritor's adoption of 
agency principles, some courts adopted a negligence analysis even 
when supervisors or managers were responsible for the abusive 
work environment. 
The multiple opinions in the en bane decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of 
America32 exemplify the post-Meritor confusion in the lower courts. 
The per curiam opinion emphasized that a majority of the judges; 
notwithstanding the tangled array of opinions, held that "negli­
gence is the only proper standard of employer liability in cases of 
hostile-environment sexual harassment even if as here the harasser 
was a supervisor rather than a co-worker of the plaintiff."33 Writing 
for six of the twelve judges, Judge Flaum persuasively argued that 
negligence is the only proper ground for finding employer liability 
because the purpose of Title VII is to deter discriminatory 
behavior.34 
The imposition of liability beyond that which is likely to deter 
sexual harassment serves no constructive purpose and unnecessa­
29. In a comprehensive article on the law of discrimination, David Oppenheimer 
argued that most discrimination is the result of unconscious forces rather than inten­
tional malevolence, and that "the existing law of employment discrimination, while es­
chewing the term negligence, frequently incorporates the doctrine." David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899,899 (1993). Oppen­
heimer discussed the then still-emerging law of sexual harassment as an example of an 
area of discrimination law that "provides substantial support for the recognition of neg­
ligent employment discrimination." Id. at 945. In subsequent years this has become 
even more apparent in the law of sexual harassment. 
30. The recent Supreme Court decisions appear to endorse this approach in the 
lower courts, although the Court has not yet considered a case involving peer harass­
ment. See Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor and Employment Law 
Term (Pan I): The Sexual Harassment Decisions, 14 LAB. LAW. 261, 307-08 (1998). 
31. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). 
32. 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997). 
33. Id. at 494. 
34. See id. at 495 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
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rily imposes costs on employers, costs that are ultimately passed 
on. 
. .. A negligence standard, which asks whether an employer 
knew or should have known about an employee's acts of harass­
ment and failed to take appropriate remedial action necessarily 
focuses on the steps that employers should take in detecting and 
subsequently correcting harassment. 
... Companies' efforts to deal with sexual harassment should 
be systematic and proactive, rather than discrete and reactive.35 
Judge Flaum concluded that the employer is under a heightened 
duty of care with regard to taking preventive and responsive actions 
when the harasser is a supervisor, because harassment by a supervi­
sor is more likely to affect the terms or conditions of employment. 36 
Judge Posner agreed that negligence was the proper standard 
of liability for behavior by supervisors and co-employees alike, and 
he emphasized that courts employing a fact-driven negligence anal­
ysis would certainly take into account the wrongdoer's status when 
deciding whether to assess liability on the employer.37 In his char­
acteristically incisive and pedagogical manner, Posner ridiculed the 
notion that Title VII incorporates the Restatement of Agency even 
if general agency principles might be relevant to a number of issues 
under Title VIps Posner's characterization of the situation in sup­
port of adopting a negligence approach is straightforward and 
persuaSIve. 
Sexual harassment is an intentional injury by the harasser, but an 
unintentional injury (in the usual case, and in the two cases 
before us) by the harasser's superiors, or in other words by the 
employer itself. The employer is innocent; the victim is innocent; 
35. Id. at 498 (Flaum, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
36. See id. at 502 (Flaum, J., concurring). Judge Cudahy wrote separately that the 
"heightened duty of care" described by Judge Flaum should be implemented by means 
of a presumption that abusive behavior by supervisors that is severe or pervasive 
enough to trigger liability is sufficient to place the employer on notice of the wrongdo­
ing and to trigger the employer's duty to respond to the discriminatory behavior. See 
id. at 504 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Judge Cudahy explained: "The negligence standard 
used to govern hostile or abusive environment claims involving a supervisor must be 
negligence as related to a special and demanding duty of care. The standard of care 
should be somewhat like that imposed on packers of parachutes or open heart sur­
geons." Id. (Cudahy, J., concurring). In contrast, Judge Kanne argued that there 
should be no presumption of liability when the harasser is a supervisor, although that 
fact would be relevant in making a determination of liability under negligence princi­
ples. See id. at 505 (Kanne, J., concurring). 
37. See id. at 512 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). 
38. See id. at 506-11 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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the optimal system of liability for minimizing sexual harassment 
requires cooperation by both.39 
Posner concluded that an employer cannot be held liable under 
negligence principles when an employee unreasonably fails to take 
advantage of a known company policy for reporting and remedying 
sexual harassment.4o 
A recent well-publicized case provides a good working exam­
ple of the negligence standard in action. The EEOC brought an 
action against Mitsubishi alleging that it engaged in a "pattern or 
practice" of discrimination because it "created and maintained a 
sexually hostile and abusive work environment at [a plant] because 
it tolerated, from the facility's inception, individual acts of sexual 
harassment by its employees by refusing to take notice of, investi­
gate, and/or discipline the workers who sexually harassed other em­
ployees."41 The complaint was premised on the conduct of 
numerous supervisors and co-employees over a period of years. 
The court plainly adopted a straight negligence approach to deter­
mining liability: "An employer can be said to be negligent for com­
pany-wide sexual harassment when it has a policy or practice of 
tolerating a work environment that it knows or should have known 
is permeated with sexual harassment, but does not take steps to 
address the problem on a company-wide basis."42 In short, the 
court openly embraced negligence principles by imposing liability 
for the employer's failure to maintain a workplace free of harass­
ment by supervisors and co-workers, rather than stretching agency 
principles to hold the employer liable for the acts of its employees. 
C. 	 Clinging to an Agency Analysis (For Now): The Ellerth and 
Faragher Decisions 
Despite the increasing use of negligence principles to impose 
liability on employers for hostile work environment sex discrimina­
tion, in two recent cases the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Meritor 
rule that employer liability is premised on agency principles.43 De­
spite the express rule in these cases, two important factors suggest 
that these decisions do not undercut the justification for using negli­
39. 	 Id. at 516 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). 
40. 	 See id. (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). 
41. EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1069 (C.D. 
Ill. 1998). 
42. 	 Id. at 1075. 
43. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257,2262 (1998); Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2285 (1998). 
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gence principles. First, both cases involved harassment by supervi­
sors within the direct line of authority over the victim, and so an 
agency analysis provided a plausible rationale for liability. Because 
the wrongdoers were not co-employees or third parties, the Court 
did not have to consider the uniform practice in the lower courts of 
using negligence principles to assess employer liability in such 
cases.44 Second, the rule announced by the Court to determine 
whether the harassment is the act of the employer according to 
agency principles is for all intents and purposes a statement of neg­
ligence principles. Adhering to Meritor's line of analysis in name 
only, the Court embraced a test of employer liability that is easily 
reconciled with the negligence principles utilized in cases involving 
non-supervisory harassment. 
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,45 the Supreme Court 
took up the confusing array of opinions generated by the Seventh 
Circuit's en banc ruling on employer liability in Jansen. In Ellerth, 
the plaintiff alleged that she suffered unwelcome and threatening 
sexual advances by her supervisor's supervisor, but admitted that 
she had suffered no adverse tangible job consequences, nor had she 
complained internally, despite knowing of the employer's policy 
against sexual harassment.46 Holding the employer liable for the 
admitted sexual harassment on these facts posed an obvious prob­
lem since no official action, such as termination or withholding job 
benefits, was taken in connection with the harassment, and the em­
ployer had established an anti-harassment policy in the workplace. 
The Court began by reaffirming the Meritor commitment to 
agency principles for determining the employer's vicarious liabil­
ity,47 and reaffirmed that "tangible employment action" by the su­
pervisor-harasser (formerly designated as quid pro quo harassment) 
constitutes the act of the employer for Title VII purposes.48 On the 
facts of Ellerth, the Court determined that the case must be re­
manded and tried to determine if the employer could be held vicari­
ously liable under a newly formulated burden-shifting rule of 
liability. The Court announced the following rule: 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized em­
ployee for an actionable hostile environment created by a super­
44. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2289 (accepting, implicitly, the use of negligence 
principles in this line of cases). 
45. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
46. See ill. at 2262. 
47. See id. at 2265, 2270. 
48. See id. at 2269. 
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visor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the 
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a de­
fending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 
see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two neces~ 
sary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, 
and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.49 
The Court held that negligence principles set only the minimal 
standard for employer liability, and that the employer's vicarious 
liability for the acts of a supervisor exist above this baseline of di­
· rect liability in negligence.50 This distinction appears analytically 
proper, but in fact is illusory. By adopting a policy in which the 
employer will be considered liable for hostile work environment 
sexual harassment by one of its supervisors unless it can meet the 
burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that it acted reason­
ably to prevent the harm, the Court has embraced the traditional 
· negligence language of duty. Consequently, there appears to be no 
substantial real world effect in demarcating an area of vicarious em­
ployer liability based on agency principles. In dissent, Justices 
Thomas and Scalia argued that negligence is the only plausible stan­
dard of employer liability in such cases, although they embraced a 
· conservative definition of the employer's duty by concluding that 
the employer in Jansen acted reasonably and could not be found 
liable for violating Title VII as a matter of law.51 
The holding in Ellerth was adopted verbatim in a companion 
case decided on the same day, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.52 
. Although the' holdings are identical, Justice Souter's opinion in 
Faragher provides a more detailed justification than Justice Ken­
nedy's opinion in Ellerth. The facts inFaragher provided a stronger 
case for imposing employer liability since the lifeguard employee 
was harassed by two of her three direct supervisors, she complained 
to the third direct supervisor, and the employer did not disseminate 
its policy against sexual harassment to the work unit in question.53 
As in Ellerth, there was no tangible employment action taken by 
49. Id. at 2270. 
50. See id. at 2267. 
51. See id. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
52. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
53. See id. at 2280-81. 
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the supervisors, and so the case ~ested the limits of employer liabil~ 
ity for hostile work environment sexual harassment. Although the 
facts suggested that the question of employer liability should not be 
difficult to resolve, Justice Souter patiently unraveled the basis for 
imposing liability on employers. 
Justice Souter began his analysis by endorsing Meritor's adop­
tion of agency principles as the "foundation on which we build to­
day."54 Consequently, he rejected a rule holding employers strictly 
liable when direct supervisors are guilty of harassment.55 However, 
Justice Souter emphasized that the Court will not mechanically ap­
ply doctrinal principles and thereby lose sight of the legislative pur~ 
poses for imposing liability on employers under TItle VII.56 He 
concluded that it would be inappropriate to hold that supervisors 
are acting within the scope of their employment when they harass 
subordinates solely for the purpose of invoking agency principles of 
vicarious liability, especially since it would be difficult to reconcile 
this approach with the uniform practice of lower courts that impose 
liability on employers for harassment committed by co-workers and 
tpird persons orily if the employer is negligent.57 Souter concluded 
that employers are vicariously liable for supervisory harassment, 
that is, even without a showing of negligence, if the agency relation­
ship aided the supervisor in harassing the victim.58 
Having established the conceptual rationale for employer lia­
bility, Justice Souter then addressed the difficult problem of draw­
ing a line between the rejected rule of automatic vicarious liability 
for supervisory harassment and imposing liability orily when the su­
pervisor is aided by the existence of the agency relationship in 
harassing his subordinate.59 Souter rejected a fact-intensive inquiry 
into whether the supervisor actively utilized his authority to carry 
out the harassment due to the fact that "the results would often 
seem disparate even if not demonstrably contradictory, and the 
54. Id. at 2286. 
55. See id. at 2288, 2291 n.4. The EEOC Guidelines provide that employers are 
automatically liable for sexual harassment committed by supervisors under an agency 
analysis, but the Guidelines do not make a distinction between quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment sexual harassment in this provision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) 
(1999). In Meritor the Supreme Court endorsed the use of agency principles but re­
jected a rule of automatic liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment. 
56. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2288. 
57. See id. at 2289 . 

. 58. See id. at 2290-9l. 

59. See id. at 2291-92. 
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temptation to litigate would be hard to resist."60 Instead, Souter 
repeated the burden-shifting holding of Ellerth as the best means of 
determining when a supervisor has been aided by his agency rela­
tionship.61 Souter's reasoning underscores that the burden-shifting 
affirmative defense essentially establishes a negligence test for lia­
bility. Noting that the purpose of Title VII is to prevent discrimina­
tion in the workplace rather than to compensate victims of 
discrimination, Souter concluded: 
It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and comple­
ment the Government's Title VII enforcement efforts to recog­
nize the employer's affirmative obligation to prevent violations 
and give credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to 
discharge their duty . 
. . . The District Court found that the City had entirely failed 
to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the 
beach employees and that its officials made no attempt to keep 
track of the conduct of supervisors like [the wrongdoers]. The 
record also makes clear that the City'S policy did not include any 
assurance that the harassing supervisors could be bypassed in 
registering complaints. Under such circumstances, we hold as a 
matter of law that the City could not be found to have exercised 
reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct.62 
This passage clearly demonstrates that the vicarious liability of the 
employer is conditioned on the employer's breach of an affirmative 
duty to act reasonably to prevent harassment in the workplace. The 
burden-shifting affirmative defense created by the Court clearly im­
poses a heightened duty on the employer with regard to the actions 
of its supervisory staff, but it nevertheless is a negligence-type duty. 
This heightened duty is justified by the greater potential for harm 
caused by supervisors and the greater degree of control over super­
visory behavior wielded by the employer; thus, the imposition of 
liability is governed by principles traditionally employed in a negli­
gence analysis.63 
60. Id. at 2292. 
61. See id. at 2292-93. 
62. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
63. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the decision because 
he believed that the record was inadequate to support a finding of liability as a matter 
of law, but also to insist that simple negligence principles should control. Under this 
more conservative approach, an employee would bear the burden of proving that the 
City failed to provide a reasonable procedure for making complaints. See id. at 2294 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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D. 	 Employer Negligence as the Basis for Liability for Hostile 
Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
In Ellerth and Faragher the Supreme Court upheld the Meritor. 
rule that agency principles govern employer liability for hostile 
work environment sexual harassment, even while implicitly ac­
cepting the universal rule that employer liability for hostile work 
environments created by co-workers and third persons is imposed 
only on a showing of negligence. Nevertheless, the holdings of 
these recent cases actually employ negligence principles, although 
the affirmative duty imposed on an employer by Title VII places a 
greater burden on the employer in the case of supervisory harass­
ment. Plainly stated, liability attaches for supervisory harassment 
unless the employer can meet its burden of proving that it acted 
reasonably to maintain a workplace free of discrimination. In ef­
fect, the Supreme Court has adopted the position of several judges 
of the Seventh Circuit in the Jansen case who argued for negligence 
principles that imposed a heightened duty with regard to supervi­
sors. In short, although the Supreme Court did not explicitly condi­
tion liability on a finding of negligence, for all practical purposes 
employer liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment 
will be determined under negligence principles. 
Agency principles might be an appropriate basis for holding 
employers liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment in 
certain circumstances. For example, if the owner and president of a 
closely-held corporation rapes, sexually assaults, and generally 
abuses female employees, many commentators would readily agree 
that the employer should be automatically liable under Title VII in 
light of the fact that the wrongdoer and the employer can hardly be 
distinguished on these facts.64 In these relatively rare situations 
there would be strong grounds for imposing liability automatically 
because the harassing conduct is the act of the employer. In Mer­
itor, Ellerth, and Faragher the Supreme Court analyzed supervisory 
My claim that the Supreme Court has for all practical purposes embraced negli­
gence principles is supported by a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sev­
enth Circuit that affirmed summary judgment for an employer that was entered under 
the negligence standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit prior to Faragher and Ellerth. 
In Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813-14 (7th Cir. 1999), the court determined 
that remand was unnecessary because the discovery conducted under the negligence 
standard of employer liability was sufficient to render judgment as a matter of law 
under the new affirmative defense. 
64. ct. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1993) (denying insurance coverage since the allegations amounted to claims of 
intentional wrongdoing by the employer). 
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, 
harassment as being analogous to this "alter ego" scenario by using 
agency principles of liability, even though the Court has always 
made clear that liability is never automatic for simple supervisory 
harassment. However, as large numbers of cases involving co-em~ 
ployees and third party harassers are decided under negligence 
principles, the Supreme Court may come to see that many cases 
involving supervisory harassment are more analogous to these third 
party cases than to the much rarer alter ego cases, even if the em­
ployer is held to a higher standard of care in preventing harassment 
by its supervisors. 
The Supreme Court may continue its practice of analyzing su­
pervisory harassment under agency principles for a variety of rea­
sons that have little to do with the theoretical basis for imposing 
liability on employers. First, the inertial effects of stare decisis 
often lead courts to continue a line of analysis despite its apparent 
deficiencies. Additionally, independent doctrinal issues may lead 
the Supreme Court to adhere to its agency analysis. For example, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the remedies available to 
plaintiffs suing for intentional discrimination by authorizing an 
award of punitive damages if the employer acts with malice or reck­
less indifference to the employee's federally protected rights under 
TItle VII.65 It is clear that Congress considered sexual harassment 
to be intentional discrimination for these purposes, even though the 
intentional actions by individual wrongdoers can only rarely "be re­
garded as the intentional actions of the employer. Consequently, it 
is possible that hostile work environment sexual harassment by su­
pervisory personnel will continue to be analyzed as an instance of 
"intentionar' discrimination in order to provide plaintiffs with the 
full range of remedies intended by Congress. 
However, even with respect to available damages, the Supreme 
Court may regard the nature of these claims as negligence-based. 
In a case decided this summer, the Supreme Court held that puni­
tive damages can be assessed against an employer under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 when a manager denies a promotion to an em­
ployee on account of her gender, but only if the manager's discrimi­
nation was intentiona1.66 The Court defined the requirement of 
intentional behavior as requiring at least that the employer discrim­
inated "in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate 
65. See 42 u.s.c. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). 
66. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999). 
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federallaw."67 A bare majority of the Court extended the analysis 
by also requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate separately that liabil­
ity for punitive damages should be imputed to the employer, even 
though allegations were made against high ranking company offi-' 
cials who withheld tangible job benefits.68 Writing for the majority, 
Justice O'Connor began by discussing agency principles, in accord­
ance with the recent decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, but she 
quickly concluded that punitive damages could not be imposed 
under strict agency principles that include a "scope of employment" 
analysis.69 
In light of the perverse incentives that the Restatement's [of 
Agency's] "scope of employment" rules create, we are compelled 
to modify these principles to avoid undermining the objectives 
underlying Title VII [to prevent discrimination by encouraging 
antidiscrimination programs]. Recognizing Title VII as an effort 
to promote prevention as well as remediation, and observing the 
very principles underlying the Restatement's strict limits on vica­
rious liability for punitive damages, we agree that, in the punitive 
damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for 
the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents 
where these decisions are contrary to the employer's "good-faith 
efforts to comply with Title VII. "70 
In short, even though the case involved facts easily characterized in 
terms .of agency principles, the Court felt compelled to modify the 
rUle'of employer liability by adopting guiding prinCiples that are 
characteristic of negligence law. In the more difficult context of 
employer liability for punitive damages on account of hostile work 
environment sex discrimination not involving any tangible job ben­
efits, it is reasonable to assume that the Court's adoption of negli­
gence principles would be more broadly embraced in line with the 
joint holding in Ellerth and Faragher. 
Nevertheless, for insurance coverage purposes it is clear that in 
the great majority of cases employers are not being subjected to suit 
for intentional behavior, but rather, for negligently failing to meet 
their statutory duty of providing a workplace that is free of discrim­
67. Id. at 2125. 
68. See id. at 2126-27. Justice Stevens, joined by three other Justices, dissented 
from this part of the opinion on the ground that the question of the employer's vicari: 
ous liability for punitive damages had not been argued or briefed below. Id. at 2132-33 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
69. See id. at 2127-29. 
70. Id. at 2129 (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citations omitted». 
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ination. Even if courts continue to describe employer liability in 
terms of intentional behavior attributed to them under (modified) 
agency principles, in separate proceedings regarding the availability 
of insurance for the employer's liability, a court should regard the 
employer's culpable behavior as being negligent in nature. 
II. RETHINKING INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR HOSTILE WORK 

ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IMPLICATIONS 

OF THE NEGLIGENCE PARADIGM 

If courts revise the basis of employer liability for hostile work 
environment by expressly adopting negligence principles as the gov­
erning standard rather than agency principles, the coverage pro­
vided by EPL insurers and their reinsurers will automatically track 
this development in the law. EPL policies extend coverage for "dis­
crimination" and "sexual harassment" generally, and policies define 
these terms by adopting the legal definition. For example, policies 
typically define sexual harassment as creating or maintaining an in­
timidating, abusive, or hostile work environment. To the extent 
that there are significant developments in the legal standards for 
assessing whether a particular set of facts meet this general defini­
tion, the policy language will incorporate those developments. EPL 
carriers therefore are at risk of having the scope of coverage under 
their policies suddenly change, but they have no choice but to as­
sume this increased risk. The marketing of EPL products is pre­
mised on persuading employers that they face great uncertainty in 
light of the rapidly changing landscape of employment law. An 
EPL policy is of considerably less value if it does not expressly un­
dertake to protect the employer from precisely this uncertainty in 
the employer's exposure to liability. EPL carriers are well aware 
that by assuming the risk of substantial developments within ex­
isting causes of action they are sailing into uncharted waters. 
There is an important caveat to any discussion about potential 
effects of changes in employment law. Every EPL policy is written 
on a claims-made basis, usually with a policy term of one year. 
Consequently, any substantial increase in risk theoretically has an 
impact only for one year. However, this theoretical consideration is 
premised on the assumption that EPL carriers will accurately assess 
such changes and react promptly. In light of the soft market occa­
sioned by intense competition (reflected in both expanding cover­
ages and shrinking premiums), carriers may react too slowly for 
fear of losing market placement. Additionally, the soft market is 
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leading some employers to seek multi-year policies with set premi­
ums, clauses to prevent cancellation of coverage except for nonpay­
ment of premium, and other restrictions on the carrier's ability to 
react quickly to a changing legal environment that directly affects 
the risks assumed under the policy. Finally, there is a tremendous 
marketing cost if the carrier reacts quickly and decisively to a sub­
stantial development in the law, since employers will regard the 
coverage being provided as somewhat fickle and perhaps even 
illusory. 
If courts recharacterize hostile work environment sexual har­
assment by imposing liability on employers for negligently carrying 
out duties imposed on them by a civil rights statute, EPL carriers 
are likely to face three significant changes in their product market. 
First, this recharacterization of the basis of liability might result in 
increased employer liability and therefore affect both the frequency 
and severity of claims under EPL policies. However, it is unclear 
how courts would define and apply negligence principles in the sex­
ual harassment context. It is possible that a negligence analysis 
could be used by conservative judges to cut back on the scope of 
liability currently created under agency principles.71 On the other 
hand, negligence principles could be used to place affirmative du­
ties on employers to eliminate harassment in the workplace by be­
ing proactive. Because the effect on employer exposure is purely 
hypothetical until the negligence analysis is defined, this potential 
effect on the EPL market will not be discussed in this Article. 
Second, this reconceptualization of sexual harassment law 
could open the potential for coverage under other primary insur­
ance products such as Commercial General Liability ("CGL") poli­
cies and Employers' Liability ("EL") coverages in Workers' 
Compensation ("WC") policies, thereby complicating the position 
of EPL carriers. The potential availability of other insurance in a 
particular hostile work environment case will lead to coordination 
of coverage problems and interfere with the universal goal of EPL 
carriers to maintain unilateral control over employment-related 
claims and litigation.72 This effect will be discussed in Part A 
71. Generally, conservative judges have advanced the claim that employer liabil­
ity is grounded in negligence principles. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 
2257,2271-75 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) Uoined by Justice Scalia); Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2294 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) Uoined by Justice 
Scalia); Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490,506-17 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, 
J., dissenting) Uoined by Judge Manion). 
72. On the other hand, if employer liability for sexual harassment is construed as 
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below. 
Finally, a reconceptualization of hostile work environment lia-· 
bility in terms of negligence principles should lead to a definitive 
recognition by courts and state insurance departments that there is 
no per se public policy bar to insurance coverage for this liability, 
even though the wrongdoer's actions are intentional in nature. This 
recognition will not only remove doubts about the enforceability of 
EPL coverage for hostile work environment cases, it will also 
render coverage for certain hostile work environment cases more 
likely under COL and EL policies. This effect on the EPL market 
will be discussed below in Part B. 
A. 	 Insurance Coverage of Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment Cases Under CGL and EL Policies 
Most first generation EPL policies contained "other insurance" 
clauses providing that any other applicable insurance would be con­
sidered primary and that the EPL policy would apply only as excess 
insurance. To the extent that changes in the law make it more 
likely that employers can obtain coverage under other policies, or 
at least trigger the duty to defend, the vexing problem of "other 
insurance" clauses will raise its ugly head.73 More recently, in re­
sponse to the competitive pressures of the market, many EPL carri­
ers have begun replacing "other insurance" clauses with express 
commitments to respond first to any claim within coverage:" De­
spite this express commitment to respond first, the availability of 
other insurance may still prove to be problematic because the em­
ployer will often have strong motivation to have another primary 
insurer answer first. Lower deductibles, the provision of the de­
fense outside of limits, and the ability to fold this exposure into the 
full range of exposures facing the employer at that time all work in 
favor of the employer seeking coverage first under non-EPL prod­
ucts. As EPL carriers seek to eliminate nuisance cases from the 
claims process by raising deductibles and self-insured retentions, 
vicarious liability for the conduct of employees acting within the course and scope of 
their employment, then the offending employee might successfully argue that he is enti­
tled to indemnification by the employer, with the employer seeking recovery from its 
directors' and officers' liability insurance carrier. Cf State v. Shallock, 941 P.2d 1275 
(Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (remanding case for trial to determine if harassment was within 
the course and scope of director's employment so as to trigger indemnification under a 
state program). 
73. On the problems of "other insurance" clauses, see ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UN· 
DERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 97 (2d ed. 1996); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. 
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3:11(e) (1988). 
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and by dispensing with the need to provide notice of a claim within 
the deductible, employers will be even more likely to pursue other 
available primary coverages. 
The availability of two primary insurance coverages for sexual 
harassment claims presents a problem for EPL carriers. EPL insur­
ers undoubtedly have assumed "first to respond" responsibility in 
order to "own" these claims. Claims management is an important 
element of any insurance product, but EPL carriers recognize that 
loss control strategies and claim management techniques will be 
crucial to ensuring the growth and profitability of this product. The 
introduction of other available coverage will frustrate this interest 
in control and claims management. 
It bears emphasis that it is not only employers who have every 
incentive to be aggressive in pursuing all available insurance cover­
age. Their employment lawyers have equally strong incentives. An 
employment lawyer who fails to investigate the availability of insur­
ance coverage for an employment dispute she is retained to handle 
may face a malpractice action.74 The potential availability of other 
insurance coverage raises particularly interesting professional re­
sponsibility and liability issues for employment lawyers selected 
from an EPL panel to assume the defense of an action that has 
been reported only to the client's EPL carrier. 
Given these considerations, the availability of other primary 
in~~rance coverage may result in complexity, if not create 
problems, for EPL insurers. The following two subsections analyze 
how the reconceptualization of sexual harassment law is likely(to 
expand the arguments for employers seeking coverage under the 
EL part of their WC policy and under the terms of their CGL 
policy. 
1. 	 Coverage for Sexual Harassment under the Employers' 
Liability Part of the Workers' Compensation 
Policy 
Employees subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace 
often suffer some form of bodily injury. Nevertheless, there is little 
possibility of triggering coverage under Part One of a WC policy 
even if sexual harassment law is reconceived in terms of negligence. 
Employers seeking insurance coverage for sexual harassment 
claims have demanded that their WC carriers defend them in civil 
actions in which an employee alleges bodily injury as a result of 
74. 	 See George M. Kryder, Safe Landings in Client Suits, ABA J., Jan. 1999, at 72. 
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workplace harassment. Employers have argued that such injuries 
fall within the exclusivity of the workers' compensation system and 
therefore their WC carriers have the obligation to secure dismissal 
of any such improperly filed claims. However, courts uniformly 
hold that claims for bodily injury arising out of sexual harassment 
are outside the quid pro quo of the workers' compensation system, 
in which an employee gives up his or her right to sue in exchange 
for (hypothetically) prompt no-fault payments for injuries. Conse­
quently, the employee is free to pursue recovery in a civil action 
and is not limited to the workers' compensation system.75 Even if 
an employee's civil claim could potentially result in a finding of a 
bodily injury not caused by discrimination, and therefore be com­
pensable exclusively under the workers' compensation system, the 
WC carrier has an obligation to defend only when an administrative 
claim for benefits under the workers' compensation laws is filed.76 
If an employee incorrectly files a claim for workers' compensation 
benefits on account of bodily injury caused by sexual harassment, 
the WC carrier would have the burden of defending the employer. 
However, the carrier would be within its right to refuse settlement 
of the claim and to seek dismissal on the ground that the claim must 
be pursued in a civil action, even though this defense obviously 
works against the employer's economic interest.77 
In contrast, insurance coverage for bodily injury resulting from 
sexual harassment may well be available under Part Tho of th~ 
standard WC policy, which provides coverage known as Employers' 
Liability ("EL") insurance. EL policies typically provide coverage 
for bodily injuries caused by accident or disease that arise out of 
and in the course of the claimant's employment with the insured 
but which are not within the scope of the workers' compensation 
laws.78 Consequently, it is far more likely that coverage will be trig­
gered under Part Tho for the typical civil action alleging sexual 
harassment.79 
75. See, e.g., Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 
723, 729 (Iowa 1993). 
76. See La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 
1048, 1056-57 (Cal. 1995). 
77. See Ottumwa Hous. Auth., 495 N.W.2d at 730 (holding that the carrier did 
not act in bad faith by refusing to settle and securing the withdrawal of the claim for 
workers' compensation benefits by a harassment plaintiff). 
78. See, e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324, 1333 
(6th Cir. 1994). 
79. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southern Publ'g Co., 894 F.2d 785, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(ruling that an allegation of assault and battery premised on an offensive touching in 
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In response to the growing number of claims under EL cover­
age in connection with discrimination suits, most carriers now ex­
plicitly exclude coverage for any liabilities incurred on account of 
personnel policies and practices, specifically including discrimina­
tion and harassment.8o Courts have generally enforced these ex­
press EPL exclusions.81 Some courts have gone further and held 
that distinct causes of action not specifically enumerated in the ex­
clusion but nevertheless premised on bodily injury are excluded 
from coverage, reasoning that collateral tort theories, such as inten­
tional infliction of emotional distress, provide only a measure of the 
injury caused by discriminatory behavior, rather than an independ­
ent basis for assessing liability.82 
Despite the seemingly broad sweep of this exclusionary lan­
guage, there are substantial openings for judicial interpretation. A 
recent New Jersey case provides several theories for avoiding the 
EPL exclusion clause in an EL policy. In Schmidt v. Smith,83 the 
Appellate Division found that the exclusion was designed to· ex­
clude coverage only for intentional conduct by the employer that 
causes injury to an employee.84 Employing the doctrine of reason­
able expectations to construe the policy language, the court held 
that the exclusion "does not specifically exclude coverage for vicari­
ous liability resulting from hostile workplace sexual harassment."85 
Consequently, the court found that coverage existed for the corpo­
the workplace, which caused physical pain, falls within EL coverage); NPS Corp. v. 
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 517 A.2d 1211, 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
80. The standard exclusion developed by the National Council on Compensation 
Insurance, Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability Insurance Policy (Apr. 1, 
1992) provides that there is no coverage for "damages arising out of coercion, criticism, 
demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, 
discrimination against or termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, poli­
cies, acts or omissions." This exclusion is likely to pass judicial muster in most cases. 
See General Star Indem. Co. v. Schools Excess Liab. Fund, 888 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding no duty to defend suit alleging conduct intended to humiliate, 
harass, and intimidate an employee, given clear exclusionary language). 
81. See Bond Builders, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 1388, 1390 
(Me. 1996); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265-66 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1994); Ottumwa Hous. Auth., 495 N.W.2d at 729. Courts have also enforced 
exclusions that generally seek to exclude coverage for "discrimination against any em­
ployee in violation of law." Michaelian v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 133, 141-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see also Bilstein Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 97­
56052, 1999 WL 96438, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 1999) (unpublished opinion). 
82. See, e.g., Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roffe, Inc., 872 P.2d 536, 538-39 (Wash. Ct. 
App.1994). 
83. 684 A.2d 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), affd, 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
84. See id. at 72-73. 
85. Id. at 73. 
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rate employer to the extent that it was vicariously liable for the in­
tentional harassment and assaults committed by the company 
president. However, the exclusion did work to deny coverage to 
the president, who was also an insured on the policy.86 The court 
relied on a federal court's interpretation of similar exclusionary lan­
guage to support its reasoning. 
Although the court [in Seminole Point Hospital Corp. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co.] found that the company's president was 
excluded from coverage under both exclusions because of his in­
tentional acts of sexual harassment, a different result was reached 
for the corporation. The court found that since the individual 
defendants were not authorized to perform acts of sexual harass­
ment, and were therefore outside the scope of their employment, 
"such acts did not constitute an intentional act as to the corpora­
tion." Nevertheless the court reasoned, the company could be 
liable for its supervisory employees' alleged wrongdoing on the 
basis of negligent supervision and/or failure to investigate. "Lia­
bility insurance policies are typically sold and purchased to pro­
vide indemnification for liability which may be imposed as a 
result of negligence." Accordingly, the court held that the in­
surer must defend and indemnify the corporation for its alleged 
negligence although not for its intentional or discriminatory 
acts.87 
The rationale expressed in this opinion would be difficult to refute..­
if sexual harassment law was explicitly reconceived as imposmgna­
bility for negligently failing to maintain a workplace free from sex­
ual discrimination. 
Last year, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the result in 
Schmidt, but adopted an entirely different rationale.88 The supreme 
court stated that the exclusion in question "might well" bar cover­
age in the case, suggesting that no reasonable insured could expect 
coverage for vicarious liabilities when the employment practices ex­
clusion excluded coverage for damages "arising out of" harass­
ment.89 Despite this dicta suggesting a broad interpretation of the 
86. See id. at 75-76. 
87. Id. at 73-74 (quoting Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
675 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.N.H. 1987) (citation omitted». 
88. See Schmidt v. Smith, 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
89. See id. at 1018. In a companion case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that a CGL policy exclusion for bodily injuries arising out of the course and scope of 
employment precluded coverage for an age discrimination claim, notwithstanding the 
carrier's failure to endorse the policy with an EPL exclusion, thus lending additional 
suggestion that this court is very predisposed to enforcing the EPL exclusion in a broad 
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exclusion, the supreme court expansively construed public policy to 
preclude enforcement of the exclusion since New Jersey law man­
dates that employers carry employer's liability coverage for bodily 
injuries that fall outside the workers' compensation system.90 Of 
greatest importance, the New Jersey Supreme Court openly ac­
knowledged that mandating coverage under EL policies for bodily 
injury caused by sexual harassment will pose a problem of coordi­
nating coverage with EPL policies, but then merely commented 
that the Commissioners of Insurance and Labor "may wish to work 
with the insurance industry to resolve or address this overlap."91 
This unanimous decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
squarely presented the problem of overlapping insurance coverages 
in cases involving claims of sexual harassment, but then remained 
silent about how to resolve this potential conflict. 
Despite the widespread adoption of EPL exclusions in EL pol­
icy forms, employers would have a stronger argument to obtain 
coverage for such claims under an EL policy if the courts imposed 
liability on employers for hostile work environment sexual harass­
ment according to negligence principles. Although the exclusion 
specifically mentions discrimination and harassment, an employer 
could rely on favorable interpretive maxims to argue that only ac­
tions by the employer, and not negligent failure to prevent others 
from committing these acts, are included within the scope of this 
clause. Alternatively, state courts may determine that EL carriers 
cannot exclude this risk, due to the regulatory requirement that 
bodily injury caused by the employer's negligence in keeping the 
workplace free of this injurious behavior must be covered by the 
policy. Under either rationale, EL policy coverage may be trig­
gered, requiring insurers to address complex issues regarding coor­
dination of multiple available coverages. 
2. 	 Coverage for Sexual Harassment Under the Commercial 
General Liability Policy 
During the past twenty years, employers have regularly sought 
coverage for employment-related disputes under their generallia­
bility and "drop down" umbrella policies, but they have faced a 
fashion. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007, 1014 (N.J. 
1998). 
90. 	 See Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1018. 
91. 	 Id. at 1018-19. 
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number of obstacles under the terms of these policies.92 Moreover, 
coverage disputes and litigation subsided dramatically as generalli­
ability insurers adopted an EPL exclusion. However, the changing 
character of sexual harassment liability suggests that employers 
may again have good reason to assert potential coverage under gen­
eral liability policies. 
a. Coverage A: bodily injury caused by an occurrence 
The CGL policy provides coverage for bodily injury caused by 
an occurrence in Coverage A. Bodily injury generally is defined as 
"injury, sickness or disease," and an occurrence generally is defined 
as an "accident." Although many employment claims do not raise 
plausible allegations of bodily injury, sexual harassment cases are 
far more likely to involve physical contact that results in injury. 
The traditional rule that emotional upset resulting from an employ­
ment action does not constitute a bodily injury unless it is mani­
fested as independent physical impairments (such as migraine 
headaches or sleeplessness)93 has largely given way. Some courts 
find that emotional distress caused by physical abuse is an out­
growth of a "bodily injury," thus providing an argument in favor of 
coverage in sexual harassment cases.94 A growing number of courts 
have rejected the limitation to physically manifested injuries alto­
gether, reasoning that the policy definition of bodily injury does not 
require physical manifestation and concluding that emotional dis­
tress is as much an affliction of the body as a physically manifested 
symptom.95 Cases of sexual harassment that involve offensive 
92. See generally Symposium, Insurance Coverage of Employment Disputes, 18 
W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 1-269 (1996). 
93. See, e.g., Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distrib., Inc., 839 F. 
Supp. 376, 379 (D.S.C. 1993); Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 129 (M.D. Pa. 
1993), affd, 22 F.3d 301 (3d. Cir. 1994); Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 814 F. 
Supp. 1540, 1548-49 (D. Kan. 1993); Presidential Hotel v. Canal Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 
671, 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d 346, 
348-49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Steve Spicer Motors, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 758 
S.W.2d 191, 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). However, if the plaintiff specifically alleges that 
the discrimination caused her to suffer "bodily injury" without further elaboration, then 
the insurer may not be able to avoid its duty to defend, at least until such time as there 
is no potential for recovery for "bodily injury" as defined in the policy. See Mutual 
Servo Cas. Ins. CO. V. Co-op Supply, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1438, 1440 (D. Mont. 1988). 
94. See, e.g., Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs V. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 
N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that allegations that a principal sexually 
molested a student in his office triggers coverage because a claim of emotional trauma 
caused by physical abuse comes within the policy definition of bodily injury). 
95. See, e.g., Griffin V. Cameron College, Inc., No.Civ.A. 96-0951, 1997 WL 
567958, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 1997) (rejecting a bright-line distinction between physi­
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touching and other physical activities that lead to harm are likely to 
be considered within the scope of the grant of coverage for bodily 
injury. As courts expand the definition of bodily injury to include 
mental distress, even hostile environment cases not involving physi­
cal contact with the victim may be within coverage. 
The difficulty facing most employers claiming coverage for em­
ployment-related disputes centers on the requirement that the bod­
ily injury be caused by an occurrence, defined as an "accident." 
The requirement that bodily injury be caused by an accident is mir­
rored by an exclusion of coverage for any injuries "expected or in­
tended from the standpoint of the insured." In the words of the 
Oregon Court of Appeals: "We do not believe that an average per­
son would consider intentional discrimination to be an 'accident' or 
a 'condition which results in bodily injury neither expected nor in­
tended.' Therefore, we hold that there is no coverage."96 Along 
these lines, courts have construed claims alleging sexual harassment 
as also alleging intentional acts for purposes of insurance coverage 
as a matter of law, regardless of whether the wrongdoer had any 
subjective expectation of injury.97 Even when the insured did not 
cal and mental injuries in medicine or in law, and holding that a discrimination com­
plaint alleging mental pain and anguish and embarrassment falls within the "bodily 
injury" definition); see also James E. Scheuermann & John K. Baillie, Employer's Lia­
bility and Errors and Omissions Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 
18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 71, 76-78 (1996). 
96. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 777 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Or. O. 
App.1989). But see Griffin, 1997 WL 567958, at *3-4 (denying summary judgment for 
the insurer as to claims by the plaintiff that she suffered emotional distress as a result of 
discrimination on account of her disabilities, since the record did not make clear an 
intent by the defendant to cause those injuries); Maine State Academy of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 699 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Me. 1997) (reversing summary 
judgment for the insurer because, although there may be an expectation of harm when 
engaging in sexual harassment, "bodily injury is not necessarily expected or intended by 
the perpetrator of unwanted sexual advances and wrongful discharge"). 
97. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wodarski, No. 94-5224, 1995 WL 610888, 
at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (finding that sexual harassment, 
assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not occurrences); 
Jefferson-Pilot, 839 F. Supp. at 380 (finding that a firing motivated by racial discrimina­
tion is not an occurrence); Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 128-29 (M.D. Pa. 
1993), affd, 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994); Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. 
Supp. 249, 254 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Sena v. Travelers Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 471, 476 
(D.N.M. 1992); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 
F. Supp. 629, 632 (N.D. Tex. 1992), affd, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993); Jackson County 
Hosp. v. Alabama Hosp. Ass'n Trust, 619 So. 2d 1369, 1372 (Ala. 1993) (finding dispa­
rate treatment discrimination is not an occurrence); Northern Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 918 
P.2d 1051, 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that sexual harassment and intentional 
discrimination are not occurrences as a matter of law); Continental Ins. Co. v. McDan­
iel, 772 P.2d 6, 8-9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Moore v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 
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personally harass or discriminate against the plaintiff, but neverthe­
less is legally liable for the actions of a non-insured, one court has 
held that alleged injury is not an "accident" and was "expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured" if the insured "knew 
or should have known there was a substantial probability that non­
consensual sexual contact was likely to result" from referring clients 
to work with a third person.98 However, when the underlying com­
plaint alleges that the employer negligently responded to the dis­
criminatory situation, or when disparate impact discrimination is 
the source of the claim, most courts have concluded that discrimina­
tion can be an occurrence.99 . 
2d 176, 181 (Cal. Ct. App.. 1996) (finding that sexual harassment is intentional behavior 
as a matter of law); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So. 2d 944, 947 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding sexual harassment is not an occurrence as a matter of 
law, regardless of the state of mind of the perpetrator); Presidential Hotel v. Canal Ins. 
Co., 373 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (finding sexual harassment is not an occur­
rence); Rideout v. Crum & Forster Commercial Ins. Co., 633 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Mass. 
1994); Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) 
(finding sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not oc­
currences); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Skapyak, No. C5-89-524, 1989 WL 
84180, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1989) (unpublished opinion) (finding that alleged 
willful and malicious discrimination resulting in demotion and termination is not an 
occurrence); Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur. Corp., 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Mont. 1988) (finding that retaliatory terni'ination is not an occurrence); Elliott v. Na­
tional Fire Ins. Co., 922 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that alleged "will­
ful, wanton and malicious" sex discrimination is not an occurrence); Russ v. Great Am. 
Ins. Cos., 464 S.E.2d 723, 725 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home 
Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 446 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (N.Y. App. Div.) (finding disability 
discrimination is not an occurrence), affd, 439 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 1982). 
98. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. M.B., 563 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997) (finding an agent liable for sending models to work with a photographer em­
ployed by a separate corporation under the control of the agent when she had reason to 
know that the photographer would sexually assault and harass the models). . 
99. See Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., CIV. A. No. 96-8481, 1997 
WL 255483, at *13-14 (E.D. Pa. May 8,1997) (finding that the complaint, which alleged 
intentional and reckless behavior, potentially triggered coverage for sexual discrimina­
tion claims since "recklessness" is sufficient scienter to impose vicarious liability under 
Title VII); Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'! Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1548 (D. Kan. 
1993) (finding disparate impact liability qualifies as an occurrence); Seminole Point 
Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44,47 (D.N.H. 1987) (finding exclu­
sion of intentional acts and discrimination is ineffective as to an employee's allegations 
of corporate negligence in hiring and supervising the offending employee); Bensalem 
Township v. Western World Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (ruling 
willful violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") can be an oc­
currence because "willful" does not necessarily refer to intentional behavior in this stat­
utory context); Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 
1205, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that an allegation that school acted negligently 
when the principal sexually molested a student in his office was an occurrence, since 
Title IX does not require a finding of intent for liability to attach); Ron Tonkin Chevro­
let Co., v. Continental Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 252, 253 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that liabil­
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If liability for sexual harassment premised on a hostile work 
environment claim is reconceived as a negligent failure to satisfy a 
statutory duty, the employer's argument that such liability arises 
from an accident would be considerably strengthened. For exam­
ple, a federal district court recently held that a sexual harassment 
claim against an employer for permitting one worker to harass a co­
worker was covered under a general liability policy as to the in­
sured employer because liability was premised on the employer's 
negligence.1OO The court reasoned: 
It is correct that Gastineau did not expressly allege a count 
.. of negligence against Fleet in his complaint. However, this is ir­
relevant when the standard of liability for a hostile work environ­
ment claim· against an employer. is negligence and Gastineau 
properly alleged negligent behavior on the part of Fleet. 
In sum, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that, in order for 
an employer to discriminate against an employee who objectively 
and subjectively has been the victim of a hostile work environ­
ment, it must have known ... about the discrimination .... If the 
employer is negligent in this way, it can be found to have discrim­
inated in violation of Title VII. Because the standard for em­
ployer liability for hostile work environment claims is negligence, 
we hold that Gastineau's hostile work environment claim against 
. Fleet qualifies as an occurrence pursuant to its insurance 
. policy.101 
This rationale is persuasive. Courts have properly found that an 
individual who engages in sexual harassment is acting intentionally 
as a matter of law, even if he did not subjectively intend or expect 
bodily injury to occur. However, if the general liability policy con­
tains a "separation of insureds" clause, the employer's coverage 
must be assessed independently. In many cases of hostile work en­
vironment, the employer will face liability arising out of a situation 
ity for failure to make religious accommodation for employee is an occurrence because 
it is not predicated on an intentional act); School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. 
Cos., 488 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Wis. 1992) (finding that allegations of indirect discrinlination 
due to the discriminatory practices of other agencies is an occurrence). 
Nevertheless, some courts have held that the discriminatory disparate impact of an 
intentionally adopted and applied employment policy is not caused by an accident. See 
Educational Testing Servo V. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. C-96-2790-VRW, 1997 WL 
220315, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1997); Loyola Marymount Univ. v. Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
100. See General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. V. Gastineau, 990 F. Supp 631, 636 
(S.D. Ind. 1998). 
101. Id. at 636, 638. 
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that can properly be regarded as an "accident" from the standpoint 
of the corporate insured. 
However, it is important to remember that insurance coverage 
is triggered by the allegations made by the third party plaintiff in 
her complaint, rather than the allegations that might have been 
pleaded. If the employee alleges only intentional wrongdoing and 
does not raise the possibility of recovery against the employer on a 
negligence theory, the carrier is within its rights to deny coverage. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently rejected the 
district court's determination that allegations of creating a hostile 
work environment as a matter of law cannot be an "accident" for 
purposes of triggering insurance coverage.102 Nevertheless, the 
court affirmed summary judgment for the carrier because the com­
plaint simply alleged that the supervisor was the agent of the em­
ployer and pleaded no facts to sustain a finding of negligence by the 
employer.103 Because the allegations involved a supervisor who 
raped, assaulted, and harassed an employee, ending with the termi­
nation of her employment, negligence was unnecessary for prevail­
ing on her claim. 
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit recently determined that an 
employer was not entitled to coverage when it was sued by an em­
ployee for sexual harassment because the complaint alleged only 
intentional wrongdoing by the employer.104 The employee alleged 
that she was the victim of intentional discrimination that was "con­
firmed, ratified, approved and authorized" by the employer, that 
the employer acted "oppressively, fraudulently, and maliciously, in 
willful and conscious disregard" of her rights, and also that the em­
ployer was liable for "negligent supervision."105 The court held that 
the allegations raised only claims of intentional wrongdoing, since 
negligent supervision under Oregon law requires proof that the em­
ployer knew of the wrongful conduct by its employees but failed to 
act.106 The court concluded that the strongly worded complaint did 
not plead a negligence-related employment tort, even as a "lesser 
included offense. "107 Although the court's reasoning is persuasive 
102. See National Fruit Product Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 98-1471, 1999 
WL 270033, at *1 (4th Cir. May 4, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (indicating that it af­
firmed summary judgment, but for "somewhat different" reasons). 
103. See id. at *4-5. 
104. See Medallion Indus., Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV-96-01615-DCA, 
1998 WL 403338, at *1 (9th Cir. July 7, 1998) (unpublished opinion). 
105. Id. at *1-2. 
106. See id. at *2. 
107. See id. 
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in light of the pleading before the court, the court erred by sug­
gesting that vicarious liability for sexual harassment is not a covered 
occurrence as a matter of public policy. lOS 
Even if an employer satisfies the requirements of the insuring 
agreement by demonstrating that it is subject to a suit seeking dam­
ages for bodily injury caused by an occurrence, Coverage A con­
tains an exclusion of coverage for suits seeking damages for bodily 
injury to an employee arising out of, and in the course of, employ­
ment. Most courts hold that bodily injury caused by discrimination 
"[arises] out of and in the course of employment by the insured" by 
definition, reasoning that the harm cannot occur without the exist­
ence of an employment relationship.lo9 Courts frequently note that 
the language of the exclusion is broad and unqualified, and does 
not, by its terms, exclude only those claims subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the workers' compensation system. Obviously, under 
this interpretation the employer faces the possibility that a discrimi­
nation suit will not trigger coverage under the employer's CGL or 
108. See id. The Ninth Circuit adopted a negligence standard for imposing liabil­
ity on an employer for sexual harassment in the workplace when the employer "knew 
or should have known" of the behavior, but then proceeded to assess the potential for 
insurance coverage by assuming that the employer must act intentionally to some de­
gree. "Thus, the rationale for denying coverage under a negligent supervision theory 
applies here as well: if the employer knew of the harassment and failed to take action, 
the resulting injury could not have been 'unforseen, unexpected, or unintended.'" Id. 
(emphasis added). 
109. See Duff Supply Co. v. Crum Forster Ins. Co., No.Civ.A. 96-8481, 1997 WL 
255483, at *15 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (applying a "but for" causation test and refusing 
coverage of an employment discrinlination claim); cf Mactown, Inc. v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 716 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that workplace battery by co­
employee during work hours giving rise to negligent retention claim against employer is 
excluded by the "cross-employee" exclusion); St. Paul Fife & Marine Ins. Co. v. Seagate 
Tech., Inc., 570 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a workplace assault 
of an employee by a co-employee, arising out of difficulties in their personal relation­
ship, is excluded from coverage since the "conditions of ... employment provided the 
time and place for the assault" and contributed to the bodily injuries even if they were 
not the proximate cause of those injuries); see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Compre­
hensive Health Care Assocs., Inc., 2 F.3d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1993); Educational Testing 
Servo V. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. C-96-2790-VRW, 1997 WL 220315, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 18, 1997); Jefferson-Pilot Fife & Cas. CO. V. Sunbelt Beer Distribs., Inc., 839 F. 
Supp. 376, 379 (D.S.C. 1993); Conrad V. Mike Anderson Seafood, Inc., No. 89-1481, 
1991 WL 22925, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 1991); Mattox Enters., Inc. V. St. Paul Mercury 
Ins. Co., No. C7-95-629, 1995 WL 541471, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12,1995); St. Paul 
Fife & Marine Ins. CO. V. Skapyak, No. C5-89-524, 1989 WL 84180, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Aug. 1, 1989) (unpublished opinion); Schmidt V. Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 72 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), affd 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998); McLeod V. Tecorp Int'l, 
Ltd., 865 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Or. 1993) (excluding coverage for alleged wrongful discharge 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Castle & Cooke, Inc. V. Great Am. Ins. 
Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
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EL policies.HO On the other hand, by virtue of this potential gap in 
coverage, an employer can utilize the favorable maxims of insur­
ance contract interpretation to limit the scope of the exclusion to 
the coverage otherwise provided by WCIEL policies if the COL 
form was marketed in this manner.111 But, as the EPL market con­
tinues to grow rapidly,. courts undoubtedly will become more 
predisposed to enforce the exclusion in light of the ready availabil­
ity of insurance specifically designed for this risk.1l2 
Arguments for coverage of hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claims, notwithstanding the exclusion, have centered on 
the fact that harassing behavior often occurs both inside and 
outside the workplace. A majority of courts, nevertheless, have 
found that the liability of the employer arises out of the fact of the 
plaintiff's employment relationship.113 However, some courts have 
adopted a more narrow reading of the exclusion that permits cover­
age if the underlying suit seeks damages against an insured that is 
not the employing entity, or if the wrongdoer is acting outside the 
scope and course of their employment when they caused injury to 
the plaintiff.1l4 In any event, the employer may insist that its in­
surer provide a defense against an employment-related claim until 
110. See Omark Indus. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 114, 121 (D. Or. 1984); 
Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Iowa 1993). 
This reading of the CGL policy makes sense, given that there is often a separate exclu­
sion for liabilities incurred pursuant to the state's workers' compensation laws. See 
Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 420 (Minn. 1997); Fieldcrest 
Cannon, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 477 S.E.2d 59, 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("We 
find persuasive that exclusion (i) specifically references liability for injuries covered 
under workers' compensation, while exclusion (j) does not."). 
. 111. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. 
Stipp. 597, 604 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
112. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007, 1010 
(N.J. 1998). 
113. See Collins Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., No. 98 CIV 
3502(AGS), 1999 WL 259519, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1999); American Motorists Ins. 
Go., 713 A.2d at 1015; Meadowbrook, 559 N.W.2d at 420; Board of Educ. v. Continen­
tal Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
114. See, e.g., Maine State Academy of Hair Design v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 699 A.2d 1153, 1158 (Me. 1997) (reversing summary judgment for insurer because 
the plaintiff did not allege that the acts of discrimination arose out of and occurred 
within the course of her employment); Bond Builders, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 670 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Me. 1996) (finding that the duty to defend is triggered, and 
not excluded, because there is a possibility that the assault by the plaintiff's fellpw 
workers was not in the course of their employment); see also Western Heritage Ins. Co. 
v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs. & Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 90 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling 
that exclusion only applies to corporate employer, but husband and wife "owners" who 
were sued in their individual capacities for harassment are entitled to coverage as 
named insureds on the policy). In Western Heritage, howeve.r, the court noted that the 
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the insurer can demonstrate that all of the alleged wrongdoing falls 
within the exclusion.115 
Although an employer's liability for hostile work environment 
sexual harassment is premised on the existence of an employment 
relationship with the injured party, the bodily injury suffered by the 
plaintiff does not necessarily arise out of and in the course of em­
ployment. As courts are now acknowledging, the agency rationale 
for imposing liability in hostile work environment sexual harass­
ment cases is rather weak because the offensive conduct in question 
is rarely within the course and scope of the wrongdoer's employ­
ment. Therefore, it appears logical from the standpoint of the in­
sured that the injury to the complaining employee does not arise in 
the course or. scope of her employment. Moreover, courts view 
bodily injuries resulting from sexual harassment as outside the quid 
. pro quo of the employment relationship, and therefore noncompen­
sable under workers' compensation laws. Given this context, em­
ployers can plausibly argue that the scope of the exclusion is 
ambiguous, and therefore the exclusion should not apply to liability 
for hostile work environment claims.116 
b. (:overage B: personal injury caused by an offense 
The insuring agreement of Coverage B provides coverage for 
damages resulting from a "personal injury" or "advertising injury," 
without limiting coverage to accidental occurrences. The policy 
gefinition of "personal injury" makes clear that Coverage B pro­
vides coverage for non-bodily injuries arising out of one or more of 
the listed torts, including invasion of privacy by publication, libel, 
and slander. Given the many obstacles to asserting coverage under 
Coverage A, and the increasing frequency of defamation claims be­
ing added to employment discrimination claims, many employers 
rely upon Coverage B to demand a defense of the suit. 
exclusion in the current CGL form provides that the exclusion applies whether "the 
insured may be liable as an employer or in any other capacity." Id.. at 89. 
115. See Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Shoney's, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (M.D. 
Ala. 1996); Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Chillum Corp., 526 A.2d 642, 644 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1987). 
116. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York re­
cently held that an employer is entitled to coverage of sexual harassment that included 
rape, since the rape did not "arise out of the insureds' business" as required under the 
policy. Nevertheless, the court held that the employer was not entitled to coverage for 
other harassing conduct by its employee because those injuries arose out of the employ­
ment relationship and therefore were excluded. See Collins Bldg. Servs., Inc., 1999 WL 
259519, at *6. 
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The primary advantage of pursuing coverage under Coverage 
B is that this coverage is triggered by certain intentional "offenses" 
rather than by "occurrences," thus eliminating the requirement that 
the injuries in question be the result of an accident.117 Many older 
umbrella policy forms expanded the coverage for personal injuries 
by specifically adding "discrimination" to the list of covered torts, 
thereby providing an obvious trigger of coverage.11B However, 
newer policies are either unlikely to contain this express coverage 
of discrimination or to include the coverage only with explicit and 
substantiallimitations,119 Consequently, employers often use alle­
117. This distinction between Coverage A and Coverage B is sometimes ignored 
by insurance carriers seeking to avoid coverage obligations by arguing that the suit 
concerns intentional wrongdoing. See Missouri Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. 
Petrolite Corp., 918 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). In Missouri Property, the insur­
ance carrier refused to defend or indemnify the employer once a determination was 
made that the employer's actions constituted a "willful" violation of the ADEA. See id. 
at 870. The insurer claimed that the employer's behavior was intentional and therefore 
could not be an occurrence, but the court properly found that the employer was seeking 
coverage under Coverage B which pertains to personal injuries caused by intentional 
torts. See id. at 873. The court noted the absurdity of the insurer's interpretation: 
"Reading the 'personal injury' definition and the 'occurrence' definition together, the 
policy apparently provides coverage for 'unintentional intentional torts' not committed 
by or at the direction of the insured ... the result of such language is 'complete non­
sense.''' Id. The easy answer to this apparent dilemma is that in a carefully drafted 
policy, Coverage B does not require an occurrence, but instead provides coverage for 
personal injuries caused by an "offense." In some policy forms the underwriters have 
not paid attention to the different character of these coverages, resulting in an incoher­
ent grant of coverage that must be interpreted in favor of the insured. See Lesser v. 
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No.CV-95-4154-KMW, 1996 WL 339854, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 
June 14, 1996). 
Of course, a particular carrier may draft its policy form to preclude coverage of 
liability for intentional torts even under the personal injury coverage. See Edquist v. 
Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. C6-95-1111, 1995 WL 635179, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 31, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (ruling that a business auto portion of the in­
sured's liability package collapsed bodily injury and personal injury into one designa­
tion (personal injury) that was covered only if caused by an "occurrence" and arising 
out of the use of the auto, rendering intentional torts committed by a supervisor against 
a female employee while in the company car uninsurable). 
118. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Clark-Peterson Co., v. Independent Ins. Ass'n, 492 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 1992) (en 
banc); see also United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 
744,749-50 (11th Cir. 1991) (denying an attempt by an umbrella carrier to obtain contri­
butions from the employer's CGL carriers because the CGL carriers had more carefully 
drafted their policies to exclude discrimination from coverage); cf. American Motorists 
Ins. Co. v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 112 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993) (finding that personal injury defined to include "racial or religious discrimina­
tion" must be read according to its plain meaning as not including all Title VII 
liabilities). 
119. See Duff Supply Co. v. Crum Forster Ins. Co., No.Civ.A. 96-8481, 1997 WL 
255483, at *10-12 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (finding that coverage for discrimination later 
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gations of defamation made in connection with the underlying dis­
crimination allegations to trigger the duty to defend.120 
Given the broad duty to defend any action that could poten­
tially result in a covered verdict, some courts will construe sexual 
harassment complaints alleging sexist comments about the plaintiff 
as triggering this duty, even if no cause of action for defamation has 
been formally pleaded.121 Coverage in these circumstances is not 
assured, however, since many courts will not read into the com­
plaint defamation allegations that are not raised explicitly, nor will 
they construe discriminatory behavior as defamatory in and of 
itself.122 
limited by exclusion of personal injury arising on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, age, 
national origin, or termination of employment did not encompass allegations of sexual 
discrimination); Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 22 
F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994); Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 
1325, 1327 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (describing the carrier's change in umbrella policy forms 
between 1972 and 1973, which stopped including discrimination in the definition of per­
sonal injury). One limitation is to include coverage only for discrimination not commit­
ted by the insured or at its discretion, in an attempt to provide coverage only for 
liabilities incurred by an employer on account of the acts of its agents. See Town of 
South Whitley v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 724 F. Supp. 599, 604 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (finding 
that exclusion of discrimination "committed by you" in an umbrella policy is enforcea­
ble because the alleged discriminatory refusal to hire was an action by the insured Town 
Board of Trustees, rather than by an agent of the Town), affd, 921 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 
1990). Another limitation provides coverage for discrimination liabilities generally, but 
excludes liabilities for employment discrimination. See Teague Motor Co., Inc. v. Fed­
erated Servo Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 1130, 1132-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that limited 
coverage for non-employment discrimination in umbrella policy is neither ambiguous 
nor illusory, even though all sexual harassment claims would necessarily be excluded). 
120. See, e.g., EEOC V. Southern Publ'g Co., 894 F.2d 785, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that allegations of defamation against employer president regarding his re­
marks about the reasons why the plaintiffs were terminated falls within the coverage of 
slander); Maine State Academy of Hair Design Inc. V. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 699 
A.2d 1153, 1159 (Me. 1997) (finding allegations of damage to professional reputation 
creates at least the potential for coverage under Coverage B of the policy). 
121. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins., Co., 931 F.2d at 751 (finding that allegations 
of harassment and discrimination by means of false and defamatory (sexist) comments 
about the plaintiff fall within the coverage of slander); Duff Supply Co., 1997 WL 
255483, at *6-8 (finding that allegations that the plaintiffs were generally referred to as 
"sluts" and "whores" raised the potential for a recovery for defamation, even though 
not separately pleaded); American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. V. Vista Med. Supply, 699 F. 
Supp. 787, 793 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
122. See Farr's Stationers, Inc. V. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 114 F.3d 1194 (9th 
Cir. 1997). The court stated that: 
Under California law, however, where, as here, the complaint does not ex­
pressly contain a cause of action for defamation, a duty to defend can be trig­
gered only where the extrinsic facts clearly put the insurer on notice that there 
is potential for defamation liability. There is no indication in this case that, by 
asserting in her supplementary declaration that she had been called a "bitch" 
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Additionally, plaintiff employees often include allegations of 
false imprisonment in their sexual harassment complaints, another 
enumerated intentional tort under the definition of "personal in­
jury" in Coverage B. However, not every unwelcome physical en­
counter amounts to a false imprisonment, and so the facts, as 
pleaded in the complaint, will trigger coverage only if they consti­
tute the tort of false imprisonment.123 Finally, the exclusions in 
Coverage B are generally less pertinent to employment litigation, 
but the exclusion of personal injury "arising out of the willful viola­
tion of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the ... 
consent of the insured" designates an uninsurable risk that may be 
relevant to some discrimination claims.124 
in front of other sales representatives, the plaintiff was seeking damages on 
account of injury to her reputation as a result of a false statement of fact. 
Id. at 1195; see also Moore v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) (finding no potential coverage because the plaintiff did not plead independ­
ent allegations of defamation or false imprisonment, and factual descriptions of acts of 
sexual harassment, such as being backed into a comer and fondled, are insufficient to 
trigger these coverages since "the allegations in question do no more than reflect the 
reality that such harassment can take place behind closed doors or in the presence of 
coworkers"); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 106, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that personal injury, defined to include 
"humiliation," is not triggered by discrimination complaint, since any humiliation ex­
perienced by the employee was a result of sex discrimination, a non-covered risk); 
Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 477 S.E.2d 59, 68-70 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1996). A complaint alleging sexual harassment does not automatically trigger personal 
injury coverage for libel and slander. See Lindsey v. Admiral Ins. Co., 804 F. Supp. 47, 
52 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Omark Indus., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 114, 120 (D. Or. 
1984). 
123. See, e.g., Cornhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 85 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that allegations that a supervisor attempted to force himself on plaintiff em­
ployee in a supply room do not trigger coverage because there was no allegation that 
the door was locked or that the supervisor detained her in the room for any period of 
time by use of physical force or threats). 
124. This exclusion is likely intended to exclude civil liabilities arising out of ille­
gal actions. See MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 80 (Kan. 1993) (en­
forcing exclusion by denying coverage to an employer that subjected its employees to 
wiretaps that were illegal under the federal criminal code). It seems unlikely that this 
exclusion would apply to any violation of a statutory scheme. See, e.g., American Jus­
tice Ins. Reciprocal v. Cates, No. 95-5038, 1996 WL 711516, at *6 (D.S.D. Feb. 13, 1996) 
(holding that the employer could obtain coverage even though its employee, a jailer 
who sexually assaulted an inmate, was convicted of criminal charges, since the activity 
also constituted an independent violation of the inmate's civil rights); Bensalem Town­
ship v. Western World Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that a 
willful violation of the ADEA does not bring the matter within the exclusion because 
"willful" is defined differently in the two usages). 
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c. The ISO exclusion of employment-related practices liability 
During the past ten years, employers have been able to trigger 
the duty to defend when Coverage A is ambiguously drafted, when 
Coverage B expressly includes discrimination, or when the underly­
ing complaint raises other torts included within the definition of 
personal injury. In response to this rapidly expanding source of lia­
bility, the Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO")125 prepared an 
"Employment-Related Practices Exclusion" endorsement designed 
to amend both Coverage A and Coverage B, by removing employ­
ment discrimination litigation from the scope of basic coverage pro­
vided by the CGL policy.126 Generally, insurers have been 
successful in enforcing this type of exclusion, and so it should be 
expected that general liability policies will include such clauses with 
increasing frequencyP7 In Frank & Freedus v. Allstate Insurance 
125. Insurance Services Office, Inc. is a national insurance industry service organ­
ization that develops and files coverage forms, promulgates advisory loss costs, and 
performs other services for and on behalf of its member companies. 
126. See Joseph P. Monteleone, Coverage Issues Under Commercial General Lia­
bility and Directors' and Officers' Liability Policies, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 47, 69-70 
(1996). The new provision excludes coverage of bodily injury or personal injury arising 
out of any refusal to employ that person, termination of that person's employment, or 
"employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions, such as coercion, demotion, 
evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, or discrimi­
·nation directed at that person." Id. 
127. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 
37 F.3d 1498 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive 
Health Care Ass'n, Inc., 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993) (enforcing a "sexual abuse" exclu­
sion and an "employment-related claim" exclusion in a CGL policy, and enforcing an 
"employment" exclusion in an umbrel1a policy); Reliable Springs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1989) (enforcing "discrimination and unfair 
employment practices" exclusion); Weinstein Supply Corp. v. Home Ins. Cos., No. CIV. 
A. 97-7195, 1999 WL 310590, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1999); Col1ins Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. 
United Capitol Ins. Co., No. 98 CIV 3502(AGS), 1999 WL 259519, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 30, 1999); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Peppers, 890 F. Supp. 634, 644-45 (S.D. Tex. 1995) 
(enforcing "employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions" exclusion with 
regard to defamation claim by one partner against another); P&C Bakeries v. North­
brook Nat'l Ins. Co., No. C-92-2555VRW, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19355, at *4-5 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 31, 1992); Frank & Freedus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) (enforcing exclusion with regard to post-termination defamation of former 
employee); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995) (discussing exclusions in Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability 
Policy); Loyola Marymount Univ. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 
528,531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (enforcing exclusion of personal injuries "as a result of an 
offense directly or indirectly related to the employment or prospective employment" of 
the claimant); Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 
727 (Iowa 1993) (barring coverage for claims arising out of conduct at the workplace); 
Devillier v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 709 So. 2d 277 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (applying exclu­
sions without discussion when president and board of directors sued for sexual harass­
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CO. ,128 the California Court of Appeals adopted a traditional "plain 
meaning" approach in applying the ISO clause to a case involving 
allegations of defamation: 
Nor is the term "employment-related" ambiguous because it is 
not specifically defined in the policy. The term is not technical in 
nature. It is used in its ordinary sense, i.e., related to employ­
ment. As a term, it modifies the specified acts (including defa­
mation) as well as the terms "practices, policies, acts or 
omissions." The clear meaning of subdivision (2) of the exclusion 
is coverage for practices, policies, acts or omissions which are re­
lated to employment, including employment-related 
defamation.129 
However, in light of the time-honored rule that exclusions are to be 
narrowly construed against the insurer, the comprehensive employ­
ment-related practices exclusion will be subject to judicial interpre­
tation that may limit its application to sexual harassment liability.13° 
Lawson v. Strauss 131 provides a good example of the "holes" 
that may remain in the exclusion. In Lawson, the Louisiana Court 
of Appeals held that the new ISO exclusion did not defeat coverage 
when women employees sued several doctors and their Eye Center 
employer for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emo­
tional distress on account of harassing behavior. The cP.urt found 
that the doctors were not carrying out their employment duties 
when engaged in this harassing behavior.132 The court reasoned 
ment); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 667 N.E.2d 295, 298 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Alexandra House, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 419 
N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding no duty to defend defamation count 
because the alleged personal injury was "related to his or her employment"); Teague 
Motor Co. Inc. v. Federated Servo Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (ex­
cluding employment discrimination from umbrella policy). 
128. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
129. Id. at 684; see also Oak Ridge Park, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No.Civ.A. 98­
3348,1999 WL 731417, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 1999) (finding that when an employee 
who explains discriminatory criteria for showing real estate to prospective purchasers 
(while secretly being filmed for television) later sues his employer for allegedly defama­
tory comments made by the employer's attorney, the defamation suit is excluded from 
the employer's coverage because "but for" the defense of the underlying discrimination 
suit, the defamatory comments would not have been made); International Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, Local 1357 v. American Int'I Adjustment Co., 955 F. Supp. 1218, 1222-23 (D. 
Haw. 1997) (summarizing the scope of the exclusion as applicable to any claims arising 
from the "employment relationship" in the course of entering summary judgment for 
the carriers). 
130. See Lawson v. Straus, 673 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 1996); cf. Schmidt v. 
Smith, 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998) (discussing similar exclusion in WClEL forms). 
131. 673 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
132. See id. at 227. 
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that the "mere fact that an employee is involved does not mean that 
a 'personnel practice,' etc. is at issue or the exclusion would have 
been written to simply state that no claims by employees are cov­
ered."133 This rationale subsequently was adopted in a case involv­
ing an employee who was driven to a hotel, questioned about 
inventory shortages, and then terminated. The court held that the 
allegation of false imprisonment "arose solely in the context of loss 
prevention" efforts rather than as a personnel practice.134 
Additional problems arise if the insurer simply adds an em­
ployment practices exclusion to an existing policy without carefully 
integrating it into the other provisions. For example, where an in­
surer specifically provided coverage for "discrimination," but later 
in the policy excluded liabilities for personal injuries "directly or 
indirectly related to the dismissal of any employee of the Insured," 
a California court found that the apparent effort to disclaim alllia­
bilities related to employment practices was unsuccessful: 
The claims of Smith in the underlying action have no relation at 
all to a dismissal from employment; she alleged, in fact, that she 
resigned after being harassed .... The mere act of unintentionally 
133. Id.; see also HS Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 642 (9th 
Cir. 1997). The court held that "for an act or omission to be 'employment-related' the 
relationship must be direct and proximate." Id. at 647. The court further found that an 
allegation by a terminated employee now competing with the insured, that the insured 
defamed him three months after the termination of employment, is potentially within 
coverage because "the statements were not made in the context of [his] employment." 
Id.; see also Weinstein Supply Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 97-7195, 1999 WL 
310590, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1999) (holding that suit for post-termination defama­
tion was excluded from coverage because the employee specifically pleaded that the 
defamatory statements were made for the purpose of covering up the insured em­
ployer's discriminatory reasons for firing him); Berman v. General Accident Ins. Co. of 
Am., 671 N.Y.S.2d 619, 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (finding that post-termination defama­
tion against former employee, who is now competing against the insured, is barred by 
the exclusion because, irrespective of the insured's motivation for making the defama­
tory statements, they "constituted an assessment of Dr. Attas's performance as an em­
ployee of the clinic and an explanation of why she was discharged. As such, these 
statements fall squarely within the policy exclusion"); Barnes v. Employers Mut. Cas. 
Co., No. 03AOl-9812-CH-00403, 1999 WL 366587, at *3 (Tenn. App. June 8, 1999) 
(holding that a suit for malicious prosecution that was brought by a former employee 
who was terminated for theft and then arrested and charged after the employer re­
ported the case to police was within the personal injury coverage and was outside the 
scope of the EPL exclusion because the injury "did not arise out of a refusal to employ 
a person, nor did it arise out of termination of employment, because [the former em­
ployee] brought suit against the plaintiff for malicious prosecution due to his arrest and 
subsequent prosecution, not his termination of employment"). 
134. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Smart & Final Inc., 996 F. Supp. 979, 988 (C.D. Cal. 
1998). 
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discriminating against someone in violation of the law cannot be 
an "offense" negating the very coverage granted to the insured 
for claims of "discrimination" by the policy itself. This interpre­
tation by Zurich of its policy would result in an entirely fictional 
grant of coverage . . . . If Zurich desires to market and sell a 
policy which provides coverage for claims of discrimination, but 
excludes all claims of discrimination by employees of any in­
sured, it must say so in dear, unambiguous policy language 
135 . 
This rationale is particularly persuasive with regard to "discrimina­
tion" coverage since discrimination essentially is a liability that 
arises only in the employment context. In contrast, this rationale 
may not be adopted by courts assessing whether the duty to defend 
is triggered by allegations of. another enumerated tort in Coverage 
B,136 
In a related vein, the ISO EPL exclusion does not specifically 
enumerate all torts included within the scope of Coverage B,137 In 
light of this curious drafting oversight, a federal district court re­
cently held that the exclusion does not preclude coverage for allega­
tions of false arrest and imprisonment arising out of the 
employment of the plaintiff, despite the "catch-all" language at the 
end of the exclusion.138 
That is, the policy defines "personal injury" coverage (Coverage 
B) as including "false arrest, detention or imprisonment" and 
other specifically enumerated conduct. The exclusion then spe­
cifically excludes employment-related conduct, such as defama­
tion, from Coverage B, but does not specifically exclude false 
arrest or imprisonment from Coverage B. Thus, false arrest or 
imprisonment is not specifically excluded in the employment-re­
lated context, and the insured ... undoubtedly had a reasonable 
expectation. of coverage for claims of false arrest or 
imprisonment.139 
Although harassment and discrimination are specifically mentioned 
in the exclusion, victims of hostile work environment sexual harass­
135. Melugin v. Zurich Canada, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 787-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
136. See, e.g., Frank &.Freedus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678, 684 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996) (finding no ambiguity in providing coverage for defamation and then 
later excluding coverage only for defamation that is related to employment). 
137. See supra note 125 and accompanying text for an explanation of the ISO and 
Employment-Related Practices Exclusion. 
138. See Zurich Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp at 988. 
139. Id. 
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ment often allege subsidiary causes of action, such as false arrest or 
false imprisonment, thereby potentially triggering coverage. 
If an employment practices exclusion is more narrow than the 
ISO language, it is more susceptible to interpretations that benefit 
the insured. For example, in Connecticut Interlocal Risk Manage­
ment Agency v. Town of West Hartford,140 the trial court held that 
an exclusion of claims "arising out of your official employment poli­
cies or practices (including but not limited to claims due to demo­
tion, selection, dismissal, failure to promote, and similar activity)" 
did not absolve the insurer of the duty to defend a complaint that 
alleged defamatory comments about an employee that in part were 
unconnected with any personnel action.141 The court noted that the 
exclusion language "contrasted sharply" with the ISO language.142 
Moreover, the court opined that even defamatory comments in con­
nection with an investigation of the employee's alleged sexual har­
assment would trigger the duty to defend, because such a claim "is 
not similar to a claim arising from a change in employment 
status."143 
In conclusion, the ISO employment-related practices liability 
exclusion is far-reaching, but not all-encompassing. An employer 
can always argue that the carrier could easily have used broader 
exclusionary language, such as "any and all claims for damages 
made by an employee, applicant for employment or former em­
ployee," and that the carrier's effort to limit the exclusion more 
precisely creates ambiguities that must be construed against the car­
rier. Nevertheless, the cases finding coverage despite the ISO ex­
clusion tend to involve odd fact situations or complaints with 
multiple causes of action. As a general rule, the courts construe the 
exclusion as precluding coverage for employment-related disputes. 
Because the exclusion was drafted with the specific goal of exclud­
ing coverage of allegations of sexual harassment, and lists both har­
assment and discrimination as excluded claims, it would appear 
highly unlikely that a court would find coverage for claims of sexual 
harassment. 
A recent case demonstrates how an employer can argue for 
coverage despite the ISO exclusion when the injured employee al­
leges facts that essentially constitute sexual harassment but pleads 
140. No. 534047, 1996 WL 219595, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 1996). 
141. See id. at *3-4. 
142. See id. at *4. 
143. Id. 
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alternative causes of action. In Mactown, Inc. v. Continental Insur­
ance Co. ,144 an employee sued a co-worker for battery, alleging that 
he placed his hands on her neck and made sexual comments about 
her.145 The employee also sued her employer, under respondeat 
superior liability, for the battery and negligent retention of the 
wrongdoer.146 The employer's insurer contended that it was ab­
solved of liability due to a specific exclusion of liabilities arising out 
of battery.147 However, the court found that only the respondeat 
superior claim arose out of the battery, and that "the negligent re­
tention claim does not fall under the language of this" exclusion.148 
The court then considered and rejected the carrier's claim that cov­
erage under a different policy was precluded by an employment­
related practices exclusion.149 The court stated: 
These provisions are not applicable in this case. Aside from the 
fact that Continental is relying on the "harassment" exclusion in 
both provisions, even though none of the claims of [the em­
ployee's] complaint are for "harassment," there is a severability 
clause in the policy which governs .... The effect of the severabil­
ity clause is that allegations of battery by [a co-employee] are not 
imputed to [the employer] so as to bar coverage .... Thus, [the 
employer's] liability, if any, under the negligent retention count is 
separate and apart from [the co-employee's] alleged intentional 
act.150 
The court plainly interpreted the exclusion to apply only to inten­
tional acts by the employer, implicitly finding that the scope of the 
exclusion was ambiguous with respect to claims of direct negligence 
against the employer.151 
This position is surely correct, although some courts have re­
fused to draw the distinction between the intentional acts of the 
wrongdoer and the entirely distinct negligent acts of the em­
ployer.152 The refusal to draw this distinction, especially in light of 
144. 716 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
145. See id. at 290. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. at 291. 
148. Id. 
149. See id. 
150. Id. at 292. 
151. See id. at 291. 
152. See Gisentaner v. United States Fire Ins. Co., No. 01-96-00466-CV, 01-97­
00233-CV, 1999 WL 339326, at *8 (Tex. App. May 24, 1999) (unpublished opinion). In 
several cases the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court has construed all 
allegations arising out of intentional sexual abuse or harassment as being outside the 
scope of occurrence coverage. In Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Camp Raleigh, 
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the clear imperative to interpret insurance policies in favor of cov­
erage, amounts to an unarticulated decision that public policy pre­
cludes insurance coverage when sexual harassment or sexual abuse 
is involved. In the next section I demonstrate that a negligence­
based imposition of liability for hostile work environment will also 
affect the public policy analysis of insurance coverage. 
B. 	 The Public Policy Defense to Coverage No Longer Will be 
Viable if Liability for Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment is Governed by Negligence Principles 
Although employers may have stronger arguments for cover­
age under CGL and EL policies if employer liability for hostile 
work environment sex discrimination is analyzed in terms of negli­
gence, carriers may argue that public policy precludes such cover­
age.153 It is well established that courts will not enforce contracts 
that are contrary to public policy, regardless of the parties' clear 
intent to be bound to the contractual terms.154 Insurance contracts 
are clearly subject to this general rule.155 This limitation on the par­
ties' freedom to contract is premised on the fact that a contract is 
never entirely a private matter, especially if the contract is a liability 
insurance pOlicy.156 By definition, a contract of liability insurance 
affects the injured third party seeking compensation from the in­
sured by providing a source of funds to satisfy a judgment. Obvi­
ously, there is a strong public policy in favor of ensuring that 
Inc., 650 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), the court found no potential for 
coverage when a camp was sued for negligent hiring and retention, since the camp 
counselor was sued for intentional acts of sexual molestation. For other cases discussing 
negligent hiring claims, see Mattress Discounters of New York, Inc. v. United States 
Fire Ins. Co., 674 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that assault and 
battery by co-employee precludes coverage of employer for claims of negligent hiring 
and supervision); Green Chimneys Sch. for Little Folk v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 
664 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that sexual harassment and retali­
atory discharge precludes coverage of employer for claims of negligent hiring and su­
pervision); see also SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 1210, 1216 
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding that allegation of negligent retention arising out of claims of 
intentional sexual harassment, assault, and battery is not an "occurrence" under Geor­
gia law). 
153. See, e.g., B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 894, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the EL policy did not exclude cover­
age for bodily injury that is caused by discrimination, but holding that coverage is pre­
cluded for reasons of public policy despite the policy terms). 
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1979); E. ALLEN 
FARNSWOR"IH, CONTRACTS §§ 5.1-.9 (2d ed. 1990). 
155. 	 See GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 39:14 (2d ed. 1985). 
156. 	 See FARNSWOR"IH, supra note 154, § 5.1. 
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injured parties are compensated to the fullest extent possible. The 
contract might also affect other persons, however, if the existence· 
of insurance encourages an insured to intentionally harm others by 
absolving the insured of financial accountability.157 It is equally ob­
vious that there is a strong public policy in favor of reducing injuri­
ous behavior and requiring that certain wrongdoers bear the full 
consequences of their actions. 
The public policy defense, when used as a limitation on prom­
ised coverage in an insurance policy, amounts to a decision on the 
facts of a particular case that the public policy in favor of compen­
sating injured parties is outweighed by the public policy in favor ·of 
preventing future injuries.15S Thus, courts deem certain claims to 
be uninsurable, despite the undesirable effect of eliminating a 
source of funds to satisfy any judgment obtained by an injured third 
party claimant. The general rule in this regard, known as the princi­
ple of "fortuity," is that "a contract of insurance to indemnify a 
person for damages resulting from his own intentional misconduct 
is void as against public policy and courts will not enforce such a 
contract."159 As recently explained by one court, among "the ratio­
nales for the public policy [against coverage for harms resulting 
from intentional acts] is the principle that an insured should not 
profit from his own wrongdoing. Another important rationale is to 
prevent wrongful conduct which may be more likely to occur be­
cause the activity is covered by insurance."l60 Thus, when courts 
invoke public policy to bar coverage, the decision involves moral 
condemnation of the actor causing harm, or a pragmatic focus on 
reducing harmful behavior, or both. 
When assessing the availability of insurance coverage it is im­
portant to read "intentional" narrowly in light of these public inter­
157. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 
1989) ("The rationale underlying ... [the public policy doctrine] is that the availability 
of insurance will directly stimulate the intentional wrongdoer to violate the law."). 
Based upon this rationale, for example, courts will not permit a party to insure against 
liabilities it incurs by engaging in criminal conduct. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Baer, 745 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 956 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
158. See Ranger Ins. Co., 549 So. 2d at 1007. 
159. Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ill. 1994). This 
public policy doctrine may be judicially acknowledged, or in some cases, directly stated 
in legislation. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch. 175, 
§ 47 (1994). 
160. North Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Sean 
W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for Intentional Employ­
ment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1256,1264-66 (1994». 
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ests. Many courts recognize that public policy does not prohibit 
insurance coverage for all liabilities incurred due to intentional 
torts, but instead precludes coverage only for liabilities arising out 
of conduct intended to cause harm. Put differently, public policy is 
implicated only when an employer seeks indemnification for inju­
ries that it intended to inflict, and not when an employer seeks cov­
erage for intentional actions that have resulted in injuries.161 It 
should be apparent that a revised understanding of the grounds for 
attributing liability to employers for hostile workplace sex discrimi­
nation should have an impact on the public policy analysis of the 
availability of insurance coverage. 
The circumstances under which courts will void coverage on 
the grounds of public policy have been carefully considered in a 
number of. cases involving discriminatory employment practices. 
These cases exemplify the fundamental tension between the two 
important public policies at stake: leaving third-party plaintiffs 
without recourse to funds contractually owed by the defendant em­
ployer, and permitting an employer to purchase insurance against 
prospective liability for discrimination against employees and appli­
cants for employment. Title VII poses subtle issues in light of two 
salient features of the statute. First, liability may exist even in the 
absence of a specific intent to cause harm by discrimination.162 Sec­
ond, the statute is structured as a public civil rights act rather than ~ 
purely compensatory scheme to aid injured parties. Although the 
courts have had little difficulty in concluding that insurance cover­
age for unintentional "disparate impact" liability is not precluded 
by public policy, the insurability of disparate treatment discrimina­
tion has proved to be more difficult to resolve satisfactorily. 
When the underlying complaint against the employer alleges 
"disparate impact" discrimination, courts generally hold that the 
161. This distinction was drawn in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. S-W In­
dustry, Inc., 39 F.3d 1324 (6th Cir. 1994), where the court interpreted the policy lan­
guage defining a covered occurrence as being neither "expected nor intended" as 
preserving "the element of 'fortuity'" by preventing insureds from using liability cover­
age as a shield for the consequences of their anticipated intentional conduct. See id. at 
1331. The court distinguished this narrow limit on coverage from the "broader range of 
losses" constituting intentional torts and held that the employer's insurer must indem­
nify the employer for compensatory damages paid to an employee after suffering a jury 
verdict for an intentional tort. See id. 
162. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title 
VII was directed against discriminatory effects in the workplace, as well as intentionally 
discriminatory actions by employers). In the lexicon of discrimination law, the former 
cases involve "disparate impact," whereas "disparate treatment" is involved in the latter 
cases. 
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existence of liability insurance does not undermine the strong pub­
lic policy against discrimination embodied in Title VII.163 Thus, 
even in the face of a statute precluding insurance coverage of inten­
tional acts that had been interpreted to preclude coverage for sex­
ual harassment and employment discrimination, a California district 
court held that the statute did not preclude coverage of a suit alleg­
ing disparate impact discrimination.164 Similarly, in 1994 the New 
York Department of Insurance clarified its longstanding prohibition 
on insurance coverage for discrimination by making clear that there 
is no public policy bar to insuring disparate impact discrimina­
tion.165 Courts and regulators have adopted this same approach 
when dealing with other anti-discrimination statutory schemes that 
assess liability without requiring proof of an intent to 
discriminate.166 
In contrast, a claim by an employee under Title VII that he or 
she has suffered "disparate treatment" on discriminatory grounds 
necessarily includes an allegation that the employer intended to dis­
criminate.167 Some courts have concluded that insurance coverage 
163. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1980). The 
court stated: 
We do not think that allowing an employer to insure itself against losses in­
curred by reason of disparate impact liabilities will tend in any way to injure 
the public good, which we equate here with that equality of employment op­
portunity mandated by Title VII. To the contrary, the fact of insurance may 
be helpful toward achieving the desirable goal of voluntary compliance with 
the Act. 
Id. at 1188; see also Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 
(S.D. Ga. 1978). 
164. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. 
Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (interpreting CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993». 
165. See American Management Ass'n v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 
802, 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (analyzing the New York Insurance Department letter 
dated May 31, 1994), affd, 651 N.YS.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
166. See Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 930 F.2d 
89,93 (1st Cir. 1991). The court found that "intent" under the ADEA included a reck­
less disregard of the employee's civil rights, and therefore concluded that "Massachu­
setts public policy does not bar insurance coverage of an employment action solely 
because it is found to violate the ADEA in an individual disparate treatment case." Id. 
As explained by the court, "Massachusetts law only proscribes coverage of acts commit­
ted with the specific intent to do something the law forbids." Id. at 92 n.3; see also Ron 
Tonkin Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 252, 254 (Or. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that liability for failing to make a reasonable religious accommodation 
does not require a finding of intentional actions, and so insurance coverage was permit­
ted); BLaST Intermediate Unit 17 v. CNA Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 687, 690-91 (Pa. 1996) 
(holding that negligent violations of the Equal Pay Act could not be condoned, but that 
public policy did not preclude insurance coverage of the damage award). 
167. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 
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for intentional discrimination would undermine the strong public 
policy against discrimination. A leading case adopting this view in 
the context of housing discrimination is Ranger Insurance Co. v. Bal 
Harbour Club, Inc. 168 The Florida Supreme Court held that a com­
plaint alleging that a country club discriminated against Jewish ap­
plicants, by precluding them from purchasing a home in an area 
that required club membership, could not trigger the coverage pro­
visions of the club's liability policies for reasons of public policy.169 
The court employed a two-part test for weighing the public policies 
at stake, first inquiring whether the existence of insurance coverage 
stimulates discrimination, and second, assessing whether the under­
lying anti-discrimination statute is intended primarily to compen­
sate the victim or to deter wrongdoing.17o Because religious 
discrimination, unlike other intentional wrongdoing such as assault 
and battery, does not yield substantial deterrents independent of 
civil liability, the court found that the existence of insurance would 
insulate those persons wishing to "indulge their own preference for 
discrimination at little risk to themselves."171 Moreover, the court 
found that anti-discrimination statutes primarily are intended to de­
ter discriminatory behavior as a matter of civil rights law, and that 
aggrieved persons would not be left without adequate remedy in 
the absence of insurance coverage since most suits are brought 
against commercial enterprises.172 
Consequently, the Florida Supreme Court held that permitting 
insurance coverage of religious discrimination in housing would vio­
late the public policies and underlying purposes of the statutes in 
question. Although Ranger does not directly consider the insurabil­
ity of liabilities arising under employment discrimination statutes, 
other courts have adopted the Ranger court's analysis when consid­
ering whether disparate treatment employment discrimination is in­
surable.173 Courts also have interpreted state statutes precluding 
(1981) (noting that under a "disparate treatment" claim, the employee has an affirma­
tive burden of production and the ultimate burden of proof regarding the employer's 
discriminatory intent). 
168. 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989). 
169. See id. at 1009. 
170. See id. at 1007. 
171. [d. at 1008 (quoting Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Western World Ins. Co., 769 
F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1985». 
172. See id. at 1009. 
173. See Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 1280, 1286 n.6 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1996), affd, 1999 WL 607914 (Or. Aug. 12,1999). Although not citing Ranger, 
a similar approach was followed in Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 905 F. Supp. 1139 (D.R.!. 1995). After holding that the racial discrimination 
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insurance coverage for intentional wrongdoing, such as section 533 
of the California Insurance Code, as a direct statement of public 
policy that precludes coverage for sexual harassment liability.174 
This public policy interest is construed broadly, such that coverage 
is precluded even if the employee alleges negligent causes of action 
arising out of allegations of sexual harassment.175 
Despite the Ranger line of authority, some courts have en-
charge was excluded from coverage under the terms of the policy, the court declared (in 
dicta) that insurance coverage for intentional discrimination is void as against public 
policy: 
Aetna argues, and this court agrees, that the public policy of the State of 
Rhode Island as articulated in the Fair Labor Practices Act, militates against 
judicial creation of a safe harbor within which Foxon may presumably violate 
the law at will with impunity. Such a result would do violence to the public 
policy of the state and eviscerate the statute's intended guarantee of a work­
place free of discrimination. 
Foxon comes before this court to seek, in essence, insulation from its own 
wrongdoing.... It would be a clear violation of public policy if businesses and 
individuals could insure themselves against liability for committing intentional 
acts of discrimination. This result would promote, rather than deter discrimi­
natory behavior .... Foxon's knowing failure to address the blatantly discrimi­
natory acts of its employees should not be condoned by shifting the burden of 
satisfying Hernandez's damage awards to Aetna. 
Id. at 1145-46. Some courts summarily hold that public policy precludes insurance cov­
erage of "disparate treatment" liabilities without providing any detailed justification. 
'see, e.g., Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distrib., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 376, 
381 (D.S.C. 1993) ("The discrimination that Ms. Pressley complains of is not the type of 
action that an employer should be able to insure against."). 
174. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D. 
Mass. 1992) (interpreting state statute precluding insurance for deliberate or intentional 
wrongdoing as precluding coverage in light of allegations that the insured flagrantly and 
deliberately violated anti-discrimination provisions and government orders); Coit Drap­
ery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(finding that CAL. INS. CODE section 533 precludes insurance coverage in a case involv­
ing egregious, predatory, and intentional sexual harassment); B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. 
State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 907-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that liability for disparate treatment employment discrimination is precluded by the 
public policy embodied in CAL. INS. CODE section 533, as well as in the anti-discrimina­
tion statutes). 
175. In a recent case, the California Court of Appeals emphasized that Coit and 
B&E make clear that allegations of sexual harassment are uninsurable even if the alle­
gations of the complaint might raise the potential for liability for otherwise covered 
claims such as defamation or false imprisonment. "Since wrongful termination because 
of sex harassment is intentional as a matter of law ... an allegation which merely labels 
such conduct as negligent is entirely ineffectual" to create insurance coverage. Moore 
v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 184(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (opinion decerti· 
fied for publication); see also Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 
356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that insurer is not liable for negligence verdict against 
teacher guilty of child molestation since the negligent acts were inseparable from the 
molestation, "part and parcel of a design" to molest the student). 
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forced insurance coverage even for intentional "disparate treat­
ment" of employees, finding that such coverage is not necessarily 
contrary to public policy.176 These cases often involve variations of 
D&O or E&O policies written for public school districts, which 
provide insurance for liabilities arising out of "wrongful acts," and 
generally do not exclude intentional wrongs. Because the very pur­
pose of many of these types of policies is to protect the public 
school from substantial losses that it may incur vicariously, and also 
by defending and indemnifying its employees for their intentional 
wrongful acts, insurers must rely on public policy arguments in an 
effort to avoid coverage obligations. In School District for the City 
of Royal Oak v. Continental Casualty Co. ,177 the Sixth Circuit ex­
pressly rejected the Ranger analysis by holding that' an insurance 
carrier is fully able to protect itself from unwanted exposure by ex­
cluding discriminatory conduct from coverage, and that an empiri­
cal inquiry into the actual "stimulative" effect of liability insurance 
on wrongdoing is too cumbersome to employ as a legal test.178 The 
176. See Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ga. 
1978). The court stated that: 
The proposition that insurance taken out by an employer to protect against 
liability under Title VII will encourage violations of the Act is based on an 
assumption that is speculative and erroneous .... Where a class of employees 
is entitled to back pay under a court order and the employer is financially 
unable to comply with the same, insurance would provide the mandated 
compensation. 
Id. at 567-68. The court also noted that the insurer remains free to exclude such liabili­
ties from coverage, and emphasized that intentional discrimination was excluded from 
coverage by the policy terms in that case. See id. at 568; see also Clark-Peterson Co., 
Inc. v. Independent Ins. Assoc., 492 N.W.2d 675, 677-78 (Iowa 1992) (en banc) (utilizing 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations to extend coverage beyond the precise terms of 
the policy with respect to intentional discrimination on account of disability). 
177. 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1990). 
178. See id. at 847-50. The court explained: 
Perhaps the existence of liability insurance might occasionally "stimulate" 
such a contretemps, but common sense suggests that the prospect of escalating 
insurance costs and the trauma of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of unin­
surable punitive damages, would normally neutralize any stimulative tendency 
the insurance might have. 
Pace Professor Willborn, moreover, we do not believe that most courts 
would wish to encourage litigation over the question whether particular insur­
ance policies did or did not have a stimulative effect in particular cases. The 
insurability of "intentional" discrimination in a given state is likely to be de­
cided categorically, we think, rather than case-by-case. 
Id. at 848. The Royal Oak court cited an articie by Professor Willborn with approval, 
concluding that the presumption that liability insurance might "stimulate" future dis­
criminatory conduct is unfounded. See Steven L. Willborn, Insurance, Public Policy, 
and Employment Discrimination, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1003 (1982). Professor Willborn 
argued that insurance coverage should generally be enforced to effectuate the public 
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analysis in Royal Oak recently was reaffirmed in North Bank v. 
Cincinnati Insurance Cos., 179 with the court reasoning that the risks 
of hefty premiums, bad publicity, and uninsurable punitive damages 
would deter intentional discrimination, and that the public interest 
might be better served by making funds available to victims of dis­
crimination.1SO Other courts have followed the Royal Oak analysis 
that there is no public policy bar to coverage of intentional discrimi­
nation.1S1 Of course, if the policy limits coverage applies only to 
negligent acts, then disparate treatment discrimination will fall 
outside the coverage, even if public policy would otherwise permit 
such coverage.1S2 
The different results in these cases are not explained by the 
courts' use of different tests, but rather by using a different applica­
policy favoring compensation unless the insured displays a "calculating intent" to en­
gage in discrimination based on the existence of insurance. See id. at 1027-30. Thus, 
Willbom's proposal would appear to strike a middle ground between the presumption 
in Ranger that insurance will have a stimulative effect, and the presumption in Royal 
Oak that it will not, or at least that carriers can avoid adverse selection by excluding 
intentional discrimination. 
179. 125 F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 1997). 
180. See id. at 988. 
181. See New Madrid County Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 904 F.2d 1236, 1241-43 (8th Cir. 1990); see also University of Ill. v. Continental Cas. 

Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). The court explained that it could find 

no Illinois public policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused by one's in­

tentional acts except to the extent that the insured wrongdoer may not be the 

person who recovers the policy proceeds. The fact that many insurance poli­
cies contain an exclusion for intentional conduct demonstrates insurers have 

not relied on any broad public policy. Defendant could have included such an 

exclusion in its BEL policy, but did not. This court will not rewrite the BEL 

policy to create an exclusion. 
Id. In Independent School District No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co., 515 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1994), the court similarly reasoned that "[w]e do not be­
lieve that a school district will discriminate against its employees simply because it car­
ries wrongful act insurance coverage; nor do we believe that school districts carrying 
this type of insurance coverage have a license to commit intentional wrongs. Accord­
ingly, we enforce the contract as it is written." Id. at 580; cf Continental Cas. Co. v. 
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that coverage for 
sexual harassment is unambiguous under the "wrongful acts" trigger and offering no 
discussion of any potential public policy bar to enforcement). 
182. See, e.g., Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n of Am. v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd's, London, 761 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 (D. Kan. 1991) (providing that the D&O 
policy restricting coverage to negligent "wrongful acts" provides no coverage for inten­
tional discrimination, even though the Kansas common law precluding insurance for 
intentional acts was modified by a statute permitting coverage of punitive damages as­
sessed against an insured vicariously for the intentional acts of its agents); School Dist. 
No.1 v. Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929, 943 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that there is no 
need to reach the public policy issue when "wrongful act" is defined in terms of negli­
gent acts only). 
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tion of an agreed upon balancing test: weighing the benefit to the 
plaintiff (permitting insurance coverage) against the harm to society 
(encouraging future intentional wrongdoing).183 Courts permitting 
coverage reject the hypothesis that discrimination will be reduced 
by denying coverage, and they emphasize the desirability of com­
pensating victims of discrimination. In short, public policy does not 
prohibit an employer sued for discrimination from ever obtaining a 
defense and indemnification under liability insurance. In fact, re­
cent court decisions evidence a willingness to permit insurance cov­
erage even for intentional discrimination by agents of the employer. 
Still, if the wrongful act amounts to a purposeful effort by the em~ 
pi oyer to cause injury to the employee, courts generally will refuse 
to enforce otherwise available insurance for reasons of public pol­
icy. In such cases, however, the insurance policy will often preclude 
coverage in unambiguous terms in either the insuring agreement or 
the exclusions; thus, the public policy doctrine should only rarely 
place an additional limitation on the scope of coverage.184 
Even when a court determines that insurance coverage of in­
tentional employment discrimination is precluded by public policy, 
the carrier's duty under the policy to defend the action is not neces­
183. For example, the dissent in Ranger questioned the court's analysis in the 
application of the rule rather than in the formulation of the rule itself. See Ranger Ins. 
Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1010-12 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, c.J., dis­
senting). Judge Ehrlich first argued that an important part of anti-discrimination legis­
lation is providing financial redress to injured parties, stating the following: 
From the point of view of the insured, protection is the primary function of 
insurance. From the standpoint of the victim, insurance affords financial re­
sponsibility. Both of these are respected, desired consequences of insurance in 
our society .... To say that the primary purpose of the imposition of liability is 
to deter wrongdoers is unreal in this world of ours. 
Id. at 1011 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting). He went on to claim that discriminatory behavior 
would not be stimulated by the availability of insurance coverage, especially in light of 
the possibility of verdicts beyond policy limits and the imposition of uninsurable puni­
tive damages. See id. at 1012 n.3 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting). The Royal Oak court cited 
Judge Ehrlich's opinion in holding that public policy permitted coverage of intentional 
discrinlination. See School Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Continental Cas. Co., 912 
F.2d 844, 848-49 (6th Cir. 1990). 
184. In most cases, the intentional nature of the conduct will remove the case 
from coverage under the terms of the policy, and so the public policy issue need not be 
reached. See, e.g., American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Vista Med. Supply, 699 F. Supp. 
787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that California law permits insurance coverage 
unless there is a "preconceived design to inflict injury," but that the policy in that case 
restricted coverage of intentional act to a much greater degree); Intermountain Gas Co. 
v. Industrial Indem. Co., 868 P.2d 510, 515 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that inten­
tional discrinlination is excluded under the policy); Rideout v. Crum & Forster Com­
mercial Ins., 633 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1994); Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur. 
Corp., 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1988). 
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sarily unenforceable. Courts have found that the duty to defend 
does not raise the same public policy concerns as the duty to indem­
nify for damages awarded pursuant to an anti-discrimination stat­
ute.ISS Other courts have held that there is no enforceable duty to 
defend when coverage is precluded for reasons of public policy, 
since the insured could have no reasonable expectation of being de­
fended in a suit that raises uninsurable claims.Is6 If the complaint 
potentially raises claims of unintentional discrimination or other 
acts that fall within coverage, the insurance carrier will be obligated 
to provide a defense of the action even if the case ultimately ends 
with a finding of liability premised on intentional discrimination for 
which coverage is unavailable as a matter of public policy.1s7 
If liability for hostile work environment sex discrimination is 
reconceptualized as negligently failing to maintain a workplace free 
of such behavior as required by Title VII, then it seems clear under 
the public policy analytical framework that insurers will have much 
weaker arguments that such liabilities are uninsurable. In effect, 
such a change in hostile work environment liability would make 
these cases similar to "disparate impact" liability for purposes of 
185. See Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 930 F.2d 
89, 95 (1st Cir. 1991); American Management Ass'n v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 641 
N.Y.S.2d 802, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). See generally Venture v. LMI Ins. Co., 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 142, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that "while indemnification of [the 
intentional tort of malicious prosecution] is precluded by section 533, that conclusion 
does not apply to [the insurer's] defense commitment which, in this policy, is a specific 
and distinct commitment. ... Obviously, the public policy concerns applicable to an 
insurer's indemnification do not extend to the provision of a defense"). 
186. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 80, 83-84 (D. 
Mass. 1992); B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
894, 908-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting CAL. INS. CODE section 533). 
187. Therefore, even in the face of an express statute defining the public policy 
interest, courts have found no bar to the duty to defend when coverage potentially is 
triggered by a complaint. See Lesser v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. CV-95-4154­
KMW, 1996 WL 339854 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 1996) (denying summary judgment for the 
insurer and holding that section 533 does not preclude the duty to defend where the 
complaint alleged covered causes of action distinct from the sexually harassing behav· 
ior); see also Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 799 (Cal. 1993) (en 
banc) (finding that the statutory bar applies only to indemnification for the intentional 
conduct, and not to the duty to defend, in a case that may involve some non·intentional 
acts giving rise to liability); Melugin v. Zurich Canada, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 784-85 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996) (clarifying the Coit and B&E decisions by noting that the policy before 
the court specifically included coverage for discrimination, and the complaint did not 
preclude an ultimate finding of liability under a disparate impact theory); Republic In· 
demo CO. V. Superior Court,· 273 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting 
CAL. INS. CODE section 533 as permitting a carrier to assume the defense of an action 
that potentially could result in liability for a non·willful failure to make a reasonable 
accommodation for an employee's medical condition). 
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determining insurability. Nevertheless, it is plausible that a public 
policy defense to coverage would continue to be relevant in cases 
where the wrongdoer is the alter ego of the insured entity and he 
engages in clearly malicious and intentional behavior by abusing his 
position of authority. Thus, under circumstances such as those in a 
leading case involving a closely-held corporation president who 
raped and sexually assaulted his female employees as a condition of 
their continued employment, a court might reasonably "pierce the 
corporate veil" and find, for purposes of insurance coverage, that 
the employer had committed intentional wrongs.188 
A student author has suggested that the different applications 
of the general public policy balancing test might be captured in a 
secondary general rule that would synthesize existing case law and 
provide reasonable guidance for future cases. Sean Gallagher ar­
gued that an employer should be permitted to insure against em­
ployment discrimination if its liability is premised on negligently 
supervising the offending employee or is imposed vicariously.189 
This principle of decision-making could explain the difference be­
tween Ranger (in which a private club controlled by the discrimi­
nating members was denied coverage for its official policies) and 
Royal Oak (in which a public school sought coverage with respect 
to liabilities imputed to it for discrimination committed by an em­
ployee) by directing attention to the nature of the insured's culpa­
bility. The assumption at work in this proposal is that the presence 
of insurance will stimulate wrongful behavior only when the insured 
entity (or its alter ego) is implicated directly in the intentional and 
wrongful behavior. If courts scrupulously assessed the culpability 
of the different persons and entities, most cases involving employer 
liability for hostile work environment sex discrimination would be 
deemed insurable as to the employer. 
This reasoning was adopted in a recent case involving the sex­
ual assault of a female inmate by a male jailer. The district court 
concluded that an intent to harm is inferred as a matter of law with 
regard to the jailer, but that the jailer's intent is not imputed to the 
employer so as to trigger the public policy bar to coverage. 
188. See Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins .. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 698 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993); see also Moore v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176,184 
n,2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (opinion decertified for publication) (noting that there was no 
claim of negligent supervision against the employer, and that no such claim could trig· 
ger coverage in this case since the wrongdoer was the owner and president of the 
employer). 
189. See Gallagher, supra note 160, at 1262. 
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The public policy argument is not applicable to this case. Here, 
Cates, the wrongdoer, was not the individual who secured the 
insurance policy; Cates' employer, Fall River, obtained the pol­
icy.... Holding Fall River liable for Cates' wrongful acts would 
not serve a deterrent effect nor would it punish Cates. Thus, 
public policy would not be furthered in this case [by barring cov­
erage for the employer]. An employer can insure itself against 
the intentional acts of its employees without violating public 
pOlicy.190 
The court simply acknowledged that the public concern behind the 
public policy bar to insurance coverage does not exist when the em­
ployer is not directly engaging in intentional harmful behavior. 
One important consideration remains. Even if the public pol­
icy argument against insurance coverage for hostile work environ­
ment liability is weak, when the public policy at stake is the 
tendency of insurance coverage to stimulate further wrongdoing, 
courts can utilize a public policy analysis as a means of morally con­
demning the underlying behavior. This seems apparent in the deci­
sions of many courts that have held that all liability incurred due to 
sexual harassment in the workplace is uninsurable, even if the 
plaintiff has couched her suit in terms of negligence. It is possible 
that courts may hold that insurance coverage is precluded for any 
person or entity on account of hostile work environment sex dis­
crimination, even if the employer's liability is assessed under a neg­
ligence analysis. The reasoning underlying this position would be to 
withhold any manner of insurance coverage in hostile work envi­
ronment cases due to the morally repugnant nature of the wrongful 
acts. 
For example, some courts have determined as a matter of law 
that sexual abuse of children cannot be an occurrence for purposes 
of insurance coverage, regardless of whether the insured intended 
to harm the child or knew that such harm was substantially certain 
to follow. 191 A number of courts have expanded what began as a 
reasonable rule by holding that coverage is unavailable even for an 
"innocent spouse" of the abuser, apparently reflecting "repugnance 
for sexual molestation, and courts' understandable reluctance to 
190. American Justice Ins. Reciprocal v. Cates, No. 95-5038, 1996 WL 711516, at 
*5 (D.S.D. Feb. 13, 1996). 
191. See Manufacturers & Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 498 S.E.2d 222, 226 
n.1 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (citing cases from a number of jurisdictions); see also David S. 
F1orig, Insurance Coverage for Sexual Abuse or Molestation, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 699, 
700-07 (1994). 
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find that such acts, or derivative claims based upon them, are within 
the coverage afforded by liability policies."192 In effect, courts are 
deviating from traditional rules of policy interpretation to express 
strong public condemnation against child abuse by withholding in­
surance coverage regardless of the rationale· for imposing liabil­
ity,193 This form of moral condemnation has now carried over to 
the employment context. In Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Camp Raleigh, Inc. ,194 the New York Supreme Court Appellate Di­
vision held that a suit against a camp for negligent supervision of 
camp counselors who sexually molested children in their care did 
not trigger coverage because the underlying actions were inten­
tional in nature.195 The court held that even if the liability of the 
employer is predicated on the employer's negligence, there simply 
was no occurrence in light of the underlying intentional behavior at 
issue.196 
The rationale in the Camp Raleigh decision, highly questiona­
ble in its own right, has also been extended to employment cases 
that do not involve the abuse of children,197 This narrow reading of 
the "occurrence" requirement in general liability policies plainly re­
flects a decision by these courts that any liabilities relating to cer­
tain intentional acts may be uninsurable as a matter of public 
policy. Such a position makes no sense in the employment context, 
however, where the employer is often an entity that is factually and 
legally distinct from the wrongdoer. There is no good reason to 
deny an employer the ability to protect itself from liabilities that it 
may incur due to the actions of its employees. Moral condemnation 
192. Michael A. Orlando et ai., Recent Developments in Insurance Coverage Liti­
gation, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 481, 483 (1999). 
193. See id. at 483-84. 
194. 650 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
195. See id. at 137. 
196. See id. 
197. See Collins Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., No. 98 CIY. 
3502(AGS), 1999 WL 259519, at *6 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1999); Sidney Frank Import­
ing Co. v. Framington Cas. Co., No. 97 CIY. 9324(LAP), 1999 WL 173263, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1999). See generally Mattress Discounters of New York, Inc. v. 
United States Hre Ins. Co., 674 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding as­
sault and battery by co-employees is intentional behavior that precludes coverage for 
the employer sued for negligent hiring and negligent supervision and relieves the car­
rier of its duty to defend); Green Chimneys Sch. for Little Folk v. National Union Hre 
Ins. Co., 664 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding sexual harassment and 
retaliatory discharge are "intentional acts and thus do not constitute an 'occurrence' 
within the meaning of the general liability policies," notwithstanding the inclusion of 
claims in the complaint alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision, relieving the 
carrier of its duty to defend). 
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of sexual discrimination is not furthered by preventing employers 
from protecting themselves in a manner that provides resources for 
plaintiffs who prevail in suits against them, except perhaps in those 
cases where the wrongdoer effectively is the alter ego of the corpo':' 
rate entity. If an insurance carrier is willing to underwrite the risk 
of employment-related liabilities, whether intentionally or through 
the use of ambiguous policy language, there is no good reason to 
withhold enforcement of the policy according to ordinary principles 
of interpreting insurance contracts. 
The unpersuasive case for invoking the public policy defense 
for negligence-based liabilities is underscored by the burgeoning 
EPL market, in which seventy or more insurance carriers are now 
writing policies that specifically provide coverage for sexual harass­
ment and discrimination. If it is against public policy for a CGL 
carrier to provide coverage for these liabilities, it would be no less 
against public policy for EPL carriers to provide this coverage. In 
light of the tremendous expansion of this form of coverage with the 
blessing of state regulators, one must assume that courts will not be 
predisposed to find public policy bars to coverage. Even in states 
where public policy is embodied in a statute, the reconceptualiza­
tion of employer liability for hostile work environment in terms of 
negligence principles will provide sufficient reason to view this ex­
posure as falling outside the scope of the statutory bar on insurance 
for intentional wrongdoing. 
CONCLUSION 
EPL underwriters ' are in an unenviable position. They are rid­
ing the uncertain wave of insurance coverage law while trying to hit 
the moving target of employment law. Liability for sexual harass­
ment, now one of the most important concerns for employers, pro­
vides a perfect example of the complex issues that face EPL 
carriers. As EPL products continue to mature and employment law 
continues to develop, there is only one thing that remains certain: 
carriers that fail to adjust to the changing environment will rapidly 
find it difficult to maintain a profitable book of business. If an EPL 
carrier begins to feel a profitability pinch, it is more likely to raise 
coverage defenses with its policyholders, thereby bringing EPL cov­
erage to the next level of complexity. Employment lawyers and in­
surance coverage lawyers must remain poised to represent their 
various clients in this volatile environment. 
